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ABSTRACT
THE 1868 ST. LANDRY MASSACRE: RECONSTRUCTION'S DEADLIEST
EPISODE OF VIOLENCE

by
Matthew Christensen
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2012
Under the Supervision of Professor Robert S. Smith

The St. Landry Massacre is representative of the pervasive violence and
intimidation in the South during the 1868 presidential canvass and represented the
deadliest incident of racial violence during the Reconstruction Era. Southern
conservatives used large scale collective violence in 1868 as a method to gain political
control and restore the antebellum racial hierarchy. From 1865-1868, these Southerners
struggled against the federal government, carpetbaggers, and Southern black populations
to gain this control, but had largely failed in their attempts. After the First
Reconstruction Act of March, 1867 forced Southern governments to accept universal
male suffrage, Southern conservatives utilized violence and intimidation to achieve their
goals, which escalated as the 1868 presidential election neared. Violence was nearly
omnipresent in Louisiana during the presidential canvass and was the primary reason
behind the Democratic victory in the state.
This violence not only succeeded in its initial goal of securing a victory for the
Democratic Party during the 1868 presidential election, but long term consequences also
arose. Louisiana responded to the violence with a series of election laws, one creating
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the Returning Board on Elections, a potentially corrupt committee that could decide
elections in the state by invalidating votes it deemed to be obtained by fraud. Nationally,
the First Enforcement Act protected black voters and rights granted by previous
reconstruction legislation. St. Landry Parish illustrates the local shift of power after
1868, where an instance of conservative boss rule occurred and the parish Republican
Party was unable to fully recover for the remainder of Reconstruction. By 1874,
conservative Democratic control was so complete in St. Landry that it became home to
Louisiana's first White League. Although 1868 was the peak of Reconstruction Era
violence, conservative Democrats resorted to force when other attempts at regional
control failed for the remainder of the period.
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Chapter I
Early Power Struggles in the South During Reconstruction

The St. Landry Massacre of 1868 was not an isolated incident. Instead, the events
in St. Landry serve as both a case study in and a precursor for the violence that would
come to earmark the Reconstruction Era. This violence emerged out of the struggle
between former Southern confederate loyalists, Southern black populations, Republican
politicians in the South, pejoratively known in the region as carpetbaggers, and the
federal government in deciding the scope and scale of freedmen's rights after
emancipation. White Southerners, who were overwhelmingly Democrats, generally
preferred a return to the antebellum racial hierarchy while Republicans promoted steps
towards equality for the freedmen. Southern attempts to control the freedmen labor
force, including labor fraud, economic sanctions, and legislation, largely failed by 1868
and forced changes in Democratic strategies. These failures, when combined with poor
economic conditions, legislative setbacks, and an upcoming presidential election in 1868,
led Democrats to champion violence and intimidation as means to acquire political
victories.
While these tactics did not lead Democrats to a national victory in the 1868
presidential election, they did win Louisiana and were able to secure a long-term power
base in localities that could not effectively curtail large scale collective violence directed
at Republicans, white and black alike. St. Landry Parish, being the center of the largest
racial massacre during Reconstruction, was one of these locales, where no Republican
organization was present that could threaten local Democratic superiority for the
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remainder of the period. Democratic control was so secure that Thomas C. Anderson, a
state Senator, was able to consolidate power in the parish after the massacre. By 1874,
St. Landry became the home of the first Louisiana White League, a Democratic
paramilitary organization designed to remove Republican officeholders from their
positions. To understand why the massacre occurred, economic, social, and political
realities of St. Landry Parish and Louisiana as a whole must be examined first.
After the Civil War, the Southern economy was in shambles. In Louisiana,
capital and credit starved planters often struggled to make ends meet and natural disasters
in both 1866 and 1867 crippled production levels on farms. To complicate the situation,
many Southerners lost significant portions of their wealth due to the emancipation of
their slaves, who now required pay. The ensuing struggle to determine the system of
labor and rights granted to the freedmen existed on the national, state, and local levels.
The Freedmen's Bureau and Union Leagues attempted to aid the freedmen in their
transition from slavery to freedom while Southern conservatives, led by multiple failed
presidential vetoes, attempted to prevent any measures of reconstruction. These federal
organizations also attempted to prevent methods of freedmen labor control by Southern
conservatives, including labor fraud and economic sanctions. Southern states passed
repressive Black Codes in 1865 and 1866, measures that were mostly counteracted by the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. By March, 1867, universal male suffrage became inevitable
with the First Reconstruction Act and violence became a strategy for controlling the
South's black population. This violence escalated as the 1868 presidential election grew
near and resulted in the utilization of large scale massacres to control the black vote. The
1868 massacres occurred as part of a progression of the sectional conflict over what
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reconstruction should entail and only occurred after previous Southern attempts failed to
wrest control from "Congressional usurp(ers)."1
Reconstruction began early in Louisiana. In April 1862, General Benjamin F.
Butler captured New Orleans, leaving Vicksburg as the last Southern stronghold on the
Mississippi at this point of the Civil War. Given on January 1, 1863, the Emancipation
Proclamation freed all slaves in areas that were still in rebellion. Because Louisiana
produced the vast majority of the nation's sugar and its production could not be replaced
without importation, the federal army took control of sugar parishes within the state,
which excluded slaves in this area from the Emancipation Proclamation. However,
federal control did not reach throughout Louisiana, leaving many parishes in the northern
and western areas of the state disputed. St. Landry Parish fell in the area outside of
federal reach and was not fully secured until the war's end. In the federally controlled
region, blacks were forced to remain at work on plantations under contract with army
supervision, although corporal punishment was outlawed as a means to control labor.
Planters conflicted often with both regional blacks and the Union army. By this point,
the slaves, realizing they were on the precipice of freedom, began to assert rights such as
a Saturday holiday. The Union army confiscated crops, property, and was often blamed
for poor crop yields after occupation; the common Southern belief being that if slaves
were not induced to work, productivity would fall drastically. Louisiana's constitutional
convention of 1864 was able to abolish slavery in the state after Confederate General

1

Opelousas Courier, 5/16/1868.
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Nathaniel P. Banks suffered multiple defeats in the Louisiana Red River campaign, but
sufficient support for universal suffrage was still absent at this time.2
Louisiana contained a distinct black Creole demographic labeled as les gens de
couleur libre, or “the free people of color,” a group mostly contained within New
Orleans. These free people of color were of African and European (mainly French or
Spanish) origin, and enjoyed many rights not accorded to other black individuals in the
state during antebellum years, including property rights. Property rights, education, and a
desire to be considered distinct from the other black populations in the United States
allowed for this free population to hold slaves and become prosperous. After the Civil
War, however, many members of this group did not fare well, as they “had not only lost
their slaves, farm machinery, livestock, buildings, and personal possessions, but their
land as well.” While a large amount of the free people of color lost much of their
antebellum status and wealth during the Reconstruction period, some maintained
influence. One of these influential free people of color was Louis Roudanez, the founder
of the New Orleans Tribune, a Radical paper that occasionally came into conflict with
moderate Republican leadership.3
Prior to the Civil War, St. Landry Parish contained much of southwestern
Louisiana, ranging from the current Texas-Louisiana border with the Sabine River in the
west, the Gulf of Mexico to the south, bordered by Point Coupe and St. Martin parishes
to the east, and Rapides and Avoyelles parishes to the north. In 1840, Calcasieu Parish
2

John C. Rodrigue, Reconstruction in the Cane Fields: From Slavery to Free Labor in Louisiana's Sugar
Parishes, 1862-1880 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 33-51; Carolyn E. DeLatte,
"Reconstruction in St. Landry Through 1868" (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, McNeese State University,
1972), 8-21, hereafter cited as DeLatte, "Reconstruction."; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural
Yearbook, 1923 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), 220.
3
Loren Schweninger, “Antebellum Free Persons of Color in Postbellum Louisiana,” Louisiana History 30,
no. 4 (Autumn 1989), 345-364.
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formed out of western St. Landry Parish. By 1860, St. Landry's northern border
experienced minor changes and on the southern border Vermillion and Lafayette parishes
were created. By the start of the Civil War, St. Landry Parish contained 1,405,000 acres
of land and multiple bayous, the most important two being Bayou Courtableau and Bayou
Teche. St. Landry contained multiple types of soil and land, allowing for a diversity of
agricultural ventures. Alluvial soil was found near parish waterways and was suitable for
both cotton and sugar production. The parish also contained prairie land that was
confined to its western reaches, where livestock became the primary commodity. In the
central and northern areas of the parish, away from the hilly region near Opelousas, black
prairie soil was found and used for cultivation of corn and cotton.4
In the early 1740's the first French traders appeared in Opelousas, the eventual
parish seat of St. Landry Parish, during a time where western Louisiana was considered
to be a frontier and later a gateway to Mexico for the Spanish. The land traded hands
between the French and Spanish several times during the remainder of the century, until
the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 transferred control to the United States. During its early
years under European control, St. Landry's economic staples consisted of cattle and fur.
The population of the parish remained small until American control, numbering only
2,453 in 1803. By 1820, cotton had received extended attention, contributing to a sharp
population increase to 10,085, numbering 5,368 free whites, 3,951 slaves, and 756 free
persons of color. With increasing cotton production and further settlement west,

4

E.W. Hilgard, "Report on the Cotton Production of the State of Louisiana, With a Discussion of the
General Agricultural Features of the State," U.S. Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census, Report on Cotton
Production (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1883), 22-24; Keith Sheldon Hambrick, "The
Social History of St. Landry Parish, 1850-1860" (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, McNeese State University,
1971), 1-4.
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Opelousas and St. Landry Parish increased in population throughout the antebellum
years.5
By 1860, at 23,104 inhabitants, St. Landry was the third most populated parish in
the state, behind only Orleans and Rapides. Of these, 11,436 were slaves, 10,703 were
white, 965 were free people of color, and one person was unlabeled. As sugar and cotton
were the most profitable goods produced in the parish at the time and each required
distinct systems of labor, the evolution of labor in the parish was correlated to their
presence. In 1860, cotton (2.7% of the statewide yield) was produced on a larger scale in
the parish than sugar (1.6%) and cane molasses (2.5%). These goods, along with corn,
were produced along St. Landry's waterways and in most of the parish outside of its
western reaches. Other goods produced include cheese (19%), tobacco (12.8%), wool
(9.6%), Indian corn (4.8%), and insignificant quantities of beans, beeswax, butter, hay,
honey, peas, Irish potatoes, sweet potatoes, rice, and varied manufactured goods. Prairie
land in western St. Landry was far from its population centers of Opelousas and
Washington, but provided significant portions of Louisiana's cheese and wool
production.6
Louisiana in the nineteenth century contained two important economic staples,
sugar and cotton. Sugar was mostly confined to southeastern Louisiana while cotton
dominated the northern reaches of the state. St. Landry Parish was located on the
outskirts of the sugar region, so while cotton remained the predominant crop sugar still
5

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Fourth Census, 1820 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1821);
Winston DeVille, Opelousas: The History of a French and Spanish Military Post in America, 1716-1803
(Cottonport, Louisiana: Polyanthos, Inc., 1973), 14-34.; Hambrick, 1-19.; Francois Xavier Martin, The
History of Louisiana From the Earliest Period (New Orleans: A.T. Penniman & Co., 1829), 205.
6
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census of Agriculture, 1860 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1864); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Ninth Census of Population, 1870 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1872).
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held influence. However, the importance of sugar dwindled in the parish prior to the
Civil War. St. Landry produced 5,950 hogsheads7 of sugar cane (2.6% of total statewide
production) and 317,970 gallons of cane molasses (2.9%) in 1850, but 1860 saw a
decrease to only 3,437 hogsheads of sugar cane (1.55%) and an increase to 339,610
gallons of cane molasses (2.5%). St. Landry's sugar production recovered when
comparing parish output to the statewide yield in 1870, with 1,988 hogsheads of sugar
cane (2.5%), and 118,110 gallons of molasses cane (2.6%), but natural disasters,
deterioration of capital, and labor issues all stunted total production after the Civil War.
Sugar did not experience recovery approaching prewar numbers until the 1880's, aided by
improved technology and more reliable labor. This reliable labor force was gradually
obtained through concessions made by planters as Reconstruction progressed, as federal
agencies and legislation forced planters to realize that a full return to the antebellum
racial hierarchy was impossible. In the 1880 census returns, St. Landry Parish produced
2,877 hogsheads of sugar (1.7%) and 190,937 gallons of cane molasses (1.6%). The shift
from sugar to cotton in the parish was drastic, as Louisiana produced 21,128 (2.7%) bales
of cotton during the 1860 census year while the 1870 returns show a yield of 14,305
(4.1%) bales. By 1880, St. Landry Parish produced 23,148 bales of cotton (4.6%).8
In St. Landry Parish during Reconstruction, sugar was unable to overtake cotton
as the predominant crop and held limited significance in regard to statewide production.
By the 1870 census, 78% of total farms in the parish were under fifty acres, suggesting
dominance of small land holdings that correspond with sharecropping, as opposed to the
7

One hogshead usually equaled 1,000 pounds when dealing with sugar.
Eighth Census of Agriculture, 1860; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Ninth Census of Agriculture, 1870
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1872); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Compendium of the
Tenth Census, 1880 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1885); H. Niles, ed., "Culture of the
Sugar Cane," Niles' Weekly Register 49 (September, 1835 – March, 1836), 10/24/1835, 129.
8
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large, centralized plantations usually used for successful sugar planting. But, sugar's
presence in the parish cannot be ignored, as unique labor formations intrinsic to sugar
planting impacted the regional effectiveness of violence and intimidation, where sugar
laborers were often more protected against attacks due to their proximity to one another
compared to the isolated nature of tenant farmers in the countryside.9
After the Civil War, "King Cotton" had not lost its importance in the South and
northern Louisiana parishes were no different. Cotton was generally planted annually
around March. During the summer months, the process of thinning took place, removing
inferior plants until the remaining plants were about twelve to fourteen inches apart.
August marked the start of picking season, and laborers picked cotton until around the
new year. During the picking season, cotton was continuously transferred to the gin
house for refinement. As with any crop in the nineteenth century, cotton was vulnerable
to environmental catastrophes. Floods, droughts, early frosts, the cotton worm, and
tornados were some of the calamities that could befall a crop. Frequent repair of ditches
and canals were necessary to prevent flooding. But, due to the length of the picking
season, less of a need for centralized and coordinated labor, and the relatively low startup
cost when compared to sugar, cotton was the preferred crop in Louisiana during the
immediate post-war years. Soil prepared for cotton planting could also be used for corn,
with both requiring the same process, easing the economic troubles many planters found
themselves in after the Civil War. These factors allowed for the creation of tenancy, also
known as sharecropping, and played a role in increased violence in country parishes

9

Ninth Census of Agriculture, 1870.
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during Reconstruction, as military intervention and federal control were limited outside
of New Orleans and areas easily accessible by river.10
After failures of alternative methods of labor management on cotton plantations,
including wage labor, planters settled on sharecropping. Here, tenants planted on tracts
of land owned by planters in exchange for what usually amounted to 1/3 to 1/2 of the
crop. Planters provided lodging, clothing, food, and often seed for those unable to
provide their own, deducted from the tenant's share of the final product. This practice
allowed planters to spread risk among their laborers, as pay was directly related to the
price received for the crop and the total yield. But, especially in poor crop years, tenants
could end up in debt and vulnerable to exploitation by the planters. Planters exploited
labor by charging tenants for costs incurred during the crop year, such as food, clothing,
and other necessities, often charging exorbitant amounts and crippling laborers
financially. Poor comparable conditions were evident by 1869, when Southern black
sharecroppers earned an average of $200 per year, while those working under wage labor
in the sugar region earned from $325 - $350 per year. Not only were sharecroppers
earning less than those under wage labor, they often found themselves isolated apart from
one another in the countryside, making them more vulnerable to violence, an important
aspect that contributed to greater violence in cotton regions during Reconstruction.11
To secure a successful sugar crop, planters faced obstacles not present with
cotton. Sugar required meticulous care of the growing plants and a very strenuous rolling

10

Donald J. Millet, ”Some Aspects of Agricultural Retardation in Southwest Louisiana, 1865-1900,"
Louisiana History 11, no. 1 (Winter, 1970), 37-61.; Charles S. Davis, The Cotton Kingdom in Alabama
(Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1974), 61-65.
11
Ralph Shlomowitz, "The Origins of Southern Sharecropping," African American Life, 1861-1900: From
Slavery to Sharecropping, ed. Donald Nieman (New York: Garland Publishing, inc., 1994), 199-217;
Rodrigue, 73-75, 150.
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season during which the crop was harvested. Sugar crop seasons also overlapped, where
one fifth of the crop was saved for the following year, a practice that would present
problems after the war when planters were forced to compensate their labor force
Experience played a large role in determining the success of a sugar crop, as the planter
could increase the quality of cane produced by allowing it to ripen longer, but by doing
so the chances of a frost ruining the crop also increased. Sugar was processed on the
plantations, a practice integrated with planting and harvesting in Louisiana on a large
scale until the 1880's. Because of the on-site processing, portions of the plantation's labor
force cut the lumber necessary for this procedure and operated the refinery machinery. In
1822, a steam powered sugar mill became available, replacing the less efficient kettle
furnaces. By 1861, nearly eighty percent of Louisiana plantations used steam power to
process their sugar. Under strictly regimented slave labor in the antebellum years, this
process ran relatively smoothly, barring any developments from nature.12
To prevent work stoppages during the rolling season, coordination between field
and mill labor was necessary. Due to this required coordination, quality differences
based on ripeness of the cane and the skill of labor both in the fields and mills, the quality
of sugar produced varied greatly even within the yield of a single plantation. Because of
these factors and differing seasonal tasks required in sugar production, planters realized
that a centralized system was required to provide for an acceptable, profitable crop. In
the immediate postwar years, freedmen desired a system of labor that deviated from the
gang labor prevalent under slavery. Early labor experiments in the sugar region found
broad success only under wage labor, as planters were able to obtain the coordinated,

12

Rodrigue, 13-20, 128; J. Carlyle Sitterson, Sugar Country: The Cane Sugar Industry in the South, 17531900 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1953), 138-139.
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reliable labor force necessary if the freedmen felt that they were treated fairly and
allowed some mobility.13
Recovery of Cotton and Sugar Prices During Reconstruction
Louisiana Cotton Production
14

Year
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877

After the Civil War
Bales
Price/Pound(cents)
131,000
32.16
167,000
24.54
248,000
28.64
351,000
25.31
567,000
17.04
337,000
21.88
503,000
20.22
454,000
17.29
536,000
15.67
689,000
13.10
564,000
11.89
586,000
11.17

Year
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877

Louisiana Sugar Production
After the Civil War
Hogsheads
Price/Hogshead
39,000
$137.50
37,647
154.00
84,256
137.80
87,090
140.00
144,881
102.26
128,461
97.16
108,529
91.68
89,496
86.50
116,867
95.82
114,146
95.90
169,331
83.00
194,964
95.50

Wartime production levels were poor throughout the Confederacy, as the
destruction of infrastructure by Northern armies, occasional planter substitution of
sustenance crops in the place of cash crops, and chronic labor shortages all contributed to
the low numbers. The fact that Louisiana's sugar economy was under federal control
made little difference. These low yields resulted in inflated prices that would begin to
experience a consistent decline as production increased after the crop failures of 1866 and
1867. After the Civil War, economic prospects improved but not significantly, as capital
used in gathering and refining of both crops was dilapidated, labor was transitioning from

13

Ibid., 59-77, 84, 93, 120-125.
Numbers differ for both sugar and cotton production in the varied government reports and other sources,
sugar moreso than cotton. For information regarding sugar, historians Joe Gray Taylor and John C.
Rodrigue have both accepted numbers presented by the New Orleans Daily Picayune on an annual basis
every September 1. Due to this historical acceptance, I will be using these numbers combined with census
data from aggregate reports in applicable years; Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 370; The standard conversion is 500 pounds/bale of
cotton. Cotton data compiled from "Statistics on Cotton and Related Data," Statistical Bulletin 99
(Washington D.C., 1951), 51,53,55,150.
14
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slave to free, and ever-important levees were often in shambles. During the post-war
period, sugar production experienced an increased recovery time when compared to
cotton, not nearing antebellum numbers with regularity until the 1880's, while cotton was
able to approach these numbers by the early 1870's. The primary differing factor in the
sugar and cotton industries that contributed to sugar's slow recovery was that cultivation
of a successful sugar crop required more capital than cotton. Due to issues with capital,
many planters were initially unable to continue operations on sugar plantations, switching
to other crops. In 1866, the Opelousas Courier noted that only five or six sugar planters
out of one hundred seventy in St. Landry before the war would be planting. Regardless
of the accuracy behind those numbers, the decline of sugar as a profitable crop in the
early post-war years is noteworthy.15
Although the state of capital, labor, credit, and infrastructure all played roles in
decreased yields, crop failures in 1866 and 1867 were primarily caused by natural
disasters. Early frosts, flooding, tornados, droughts, and harmful insects were examples
of problems that could beset a planter in nineteenth century Louisiana. These problems
were not new, but when combined with regional changes after the Civil War, credit and
labor starved planters were often crippled when a natural disaster struck. Early frosts
could destroy entire crops. Many levees were in poor repair after the Civil War and
floods became a common concern throughout Louisiana. In 1866, the Southern Sentinel
found that it was "safe to predict an almost universal destruction of the crops" in areas of
the state in which the Red or Mississippi rivers flowed. Multiple tornados occurred
during this time period, wreaking havoc on crops and infrastructure wherever they

15

Opelousas Courier, 11/17/1866; Statistical Bulletin 99 (Washington D.C., 1951), 51,53,55; Sitterson,
231-232.
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appeared. Insects also whittled down crop numbers, none more than the dreaded cotton
worm, also known as the army worm. Cotton worms appeared late in the summer,
causing heavier damage the later the crop was cultivated.16
Disease was a common regional problem in subtropical, swampy Louisiana,
including but not limited to cholera, yellow fever, and small pox. Yellow fever was
particularly devastating and widely feared, as regional outbreaks could tear through an
entire community if left unchecked. In 1853, a massive yellow fever outbreak consumed
St. Landry Parish, resulting in an ordinance that enforced quarantine procedures. But,
these procedures were not as effective as was hoped and resulted in many citizens
deserting Opelousas to avoid contamination. The next large outbreak occurred in the late
summer of 1867, in the midst of regional crop failures, a destroyed Southern economy,
and a contested transition from slave to free labor. On August 10, the Opelousas Board
of Police revised the 1853 quarantine ordinance to remove any infected individuals from
the town limits, prohibit shipping through waterways, and prevent any travel or trade
with the town of Washington, where the disease was declared to be an "epidemic." The
Opelousas Relief Association formed on October 6 to combat the disease, which was
composed out of the St. Landry Police Jury and included prominent Democrats that
would play a role in the 1868 massacre, such as Charles Thompson, a local businessman,
and Felix King, later to become the mayor of Opelousas. Despite the optimistic claims of
the Opelousas Courier that the city of Opelousas remained relatively unscathed, reports
of yellow fever deaths appeared with regularity. In fact, just as in 1853, many in charge
of enforcing the quarantine and operating the Opelousas Relief Association simply fled

16

Southern Sentinel, 6/2/1866; Opelousas Courier, 7/27/1867, 2/1/1868.
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the town to a safer area, leaving the citizens without adequate protection from the
disease.17
Internal improvements were a constant concern for residents of St. Landry Parish,
but goals regarding upkeep were rarely realized due to problems such as labor shortages
and funding deficiencies. Inadequate protection against fire was a common complaint of
parish residents, who had experienced over a dozen fires during the previous decade. The
Opelousas Fire Company reformed in late 1865 after several years of no operation.
However, fears had not been alleviated by the reappearance of the fire company, as one
parish resident called for an investigation of dwellings within the city limits of
Opelousas. This resident believed that improperly placed stoves and chimneys posed an
"imminent danger" to the safety of the inhabitants within. Fire safety was not the only
concern regarding parish infrastructure, for parish roads and bridges were often in poor
condition and greatly hindered travel.18
Proper upkeep of roads and bridges was necessary for intra-parish travel and for
the transportation of goods to New Orleans, as the inability to get goods to market could
spell disaster for planters. St. Landry had trouble maintaining its roads before the Civil
War, but by the final stretches of the conflict more issues became apparent. In early
1865, the Opelousas Courier complained about how the devaluation of Confederate
currency reduced the tax revenue to 1/20 of pre-war levels. Poor levee repair increased
regional flooding, which in turn washed out and destroyed many roads and bridges. Road
overseers, appointed to maintain roads, and plantation hands were often sent as labor for
this work under threat of a fine, but their effectiveness was not permanent and was
17

Opelousas Courier, 5/12/1866, 9/21/1867, 9/28/1867, 10/12/1867, 10/19/1867, 10/26/1867, 11/9/1867,
11/16/1867; Opelousas Journal, 11/23/1867; DeLatte, "Reconstruction," 94-96; Hambrick, 71-75.
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Opelousas Courier, 12/2/1865; Southern Sentinel, 1/27/1866; Hambrick, 64-66.
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usually limited to roads benefiting the planters that provided the labor. Conditions had
not improved by 1867, with one local newspaper declaring that only the "rash
adventurer" would dare to traverse the muddy road between Opelousas and nearby
Washington, located six miles north. Bridges necessary for travel within the parish were
also in constant need of repair. In 1867, the St. Landry Toll Bridge Company was
created to maintain multiple bridges within the parish and installed a toll system for
funding. This company was led by influential men in the parish, including Elbert Gantt,
president of the police jury, Yves D'Avy, parish recorder, and Thomas C. Anderson, a
state senator from 1864-1866 and 1868-1877 who was able to consolidate power in St.
Landry after the 1868 massacre.19
Levees along the Mississippi and Red Rivers had also gone largely neglected
during the Civil War, causing floods that destroyed infrastructure and a significant
number of crops. After the war, ventures to repair these levees were often short-term and
poorly done, as funding and adequate labor were difficult to obtain. In 1866, a Louisiana
Board of Levee Commissioners was created to oversee levee works. Fear of floods
caused by levee breaks and anticipation of successful repairs permeated newspapers
during the 1860's, but how and by whom the repairs would be completed presented a
problem for poorly funded local and state governments. Due to the intense labor required
to maintain and repair the levees, many freedmen required higher pay to do these jobs.
Some freedmen that desired increased mobility without a binding contract became

19

Opelousas Courier, 2/4/1865; Southern Sentinel, 2/17/1866, 5/4/1867, 5/25/1867; Hambrick, 68-71;
DeLatte, "Reconstruction," 45-48.
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jobbers, taking work at plantations that regular hands did not want, such as levee
maintenance and woodcutting.20
Although economic hardships, disease, and natural disasters were all influential in
the lives of Southern whites, the fate of the newly emancipated slaves was their foremost
concern. Along with the threat of black suffrage, the most significant change facing
planters and freedmen during the initial post-war years was the transition from slave to
free labor. The Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands was created in
1865 to aid freedmen in the transition from slavery to freedom by providing legal
protection, schooling, medical aid, and relief for indigent citizens. The Freedmen's
Bureau also provided planters with farming implements and seed in exchange for a crop
lien, oversaw labor contracts, and controlled apportionment of confiscated land.
However, President Andrew Johnson's leniency with the defeated Confederate
landholders limited the Bureau's effectiveness; many of these apportionments were
returned to the previous Confederate owners, discouraging freedmen who had hoped for
the fulfillment of "forty acres and a mule." The Bureau also suffered from a chronic lack
of adequate funding, as evidenced by their inability to provide relief during the winter of
1866-67. Additional funds to the indigent citizens of Louisiana were discontinued on
August 20, 1867, leaving many without support in the face of another crop failure.21
After emancipation, freedmen generally desired increased autonomy and rights in
the workplace while planters wanted increased control similar to that which they held in
the antebellum years. Compromise and struggle between freedman autonomy and planter
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control became the norm during Reconstruction, from which multiple strategies evolved
in order to attain results. Economic advancement by the freedmen was seen by Southern
Democrats as disastrous to the preferred antebellum social hierarchy and attempts to
prevent this were central to Southern actions. The total labor force decreased after
emancipation, as women generally left the fields and tended to matters at home.
Freedmen in general proved reluctant to return to the plantation, especially under gang
labor, and after the Civil War Southern cities experienced a large influx of those who
wished to earn a living without working the fields. Due to the decreased labor pool and
freedmen resistance to working similar hours to what they worked as slaves, a labor
shortage plagued the South in the post-war years, leading to planter competition for the
scarce resource. If one planter offered better pay or living conditions, freedmen would
often leave their prior employer, an act that could prove crippling to total production if
the crop was ready for harvest.
This led to planter resistance and even an act passed by the Louisiana legislature
on December 21, 1865 to prevent labor enticement by rival planters, enforced by a fine
and potential prison time. Legislation such as this constituted the Black Codes, enacted
in 1865 and 1866. The Black Codes were an attempt to control labor by restricting the
freedmen's movement and limiting their economic opportunities. Louisiana's Black
Codes reflected white fears and desires regarding the newly emancipated slaves.
Freedmen were to remain unarmed, vagrancy laws passed circumscribing freedpeople's
movement, compulsory apprenticeship measures were enacted for children whose parents
were deemed unfit, and measures were taken to limit labor enticement. Some of these
laws, especially regarding vagrancy, were influential in forming the convict lease system
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that would plague the South in the latter part of the century, stating that if the offender
could not pay the fine, lawmen could "detain and hire out a vagrant for a period not
exceeding twelve months." The primary function of the Black Codes was to create a
reliable labor force comprised of freedmen. Codes installed by individual states were
often vague, not specifically mentioning freedmen as their targets, attempting to be
discreet and avoid Northern suspicions. But, Southern states had indeed become the
masters of former slaves and local governments were often more direct in their approach
to compelling black labor.22
In Opelousas, some of the most extreme measures nationwide in controlling the
black labor force were found. On July 3, 1865, the Opelousas Board of Police approved
an ordinance pertaining to rights of freedmen within the city limits. The restrictive
ordinance required freedmen to acquire passes from their employers if they were to enter
the city, set a curfew at 10:00 p.m., and forbade freedmen to take up residence in town,
carry firearms, or hold public meetings. The clauses pertaining to the freedmen's rights
to carry firearms and hold public meetings highlighted concerns held by the Southern
whites that would come to the forefront in Radical Reconstruction. In 1865, and through
Reconstruction, a primary desire held by planters was to get the freedmen back to work
on plantations, preferably under the same terms as slavery. The Opelousas Courier
found these measures to be necessary, citing "indolence and idleness bordering on
vagrancy" of the freedmen and an uncertainty in regard to whether the freedmen would
change employers once they had the opportunity to do so. Due to a national outcry,
represented by a mention in Carl Schurz's Report on the Condition of the South and
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attacks by T.W. Conway, Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana, the
ordinance was never enforced. As the political landscape changed with the 1866 Civil
Rights Bill and the beginning of Radical Reconstruction in early 1867, many state
governments were forced to abandon some of the more discriminatory sections of the
Black Codes. Hence, planters searched for alternative means to remedy the "labor
problem."23
Another method taken by planters to control labor was through contract fraud.
Initial labor contracts bound freedmen to the plantation for the planting year, but these
were generally resisted. Freedmen and their allies desired monthly payment schedules,
which were attained as planters realized that some form of accommodation was necessary
in order to secure a profitable crop. Radical papers such as the New Orleans Tribune
promoted these short contracts, preaching that long contracts were "intended by the
employer to renew a servitude or bondage." One planter was astonished when a
freedman complained that it was "not like freedom" and a breach of contract for his cabin
to be entered with the intruder telling him to "get up." These contracts often limited
mobility, created economic sanctions for missing work, and sometimes provided
measures for the planters to keep the freedmen in perpetual debt. General stores on
plantations, owned by planters, were often exploitative by charging freedmen egregious
prices for goods. In both sugar and cotton regions, a portion of wages were typically held
until the end of the year to ensure freedmen labor throughout the year. Federal
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organizations such as the Freedmen's Bureau and Union League combated this contract
fraud and frustrated planters in the process.24
An important role of the Freedmen's Bureau was to help freedmen avoid
fraudulent labor contracts. Although the Bureau focused on the welfare of freedmen, it
was also cognizant of Southern post-war realities in that planter cooperation was
necessary. During its lifetime, the Bureau attempted to secure fair contracts while
providing the stable labor force desired by planters. On December 4, 1865, the Louisiana
Freedmen's Bureau set regulations on labor contracts for the state. These regulations
stipulated that all binding labor contracts pass Bureau inspection, set standards of ten
hour days and twenty-six day work months before overtime pay, reserved Sundays for
religious observation, and included the requirement of monthly pay schedules. Labor
was to be provided with housing, food, and clothing. If desired by both parties, food and
clothing could be purchased from a plantation store at "usual market rates" to prevent
price gouging. To provide a secure labor force for planters, the local Bureau agent set
and enforced economic sanctions for labor that refused to work. To supplement limited
funding received by the Bureau, five percent of all payments to labor would be
appropriated to Bureau schools. Although these regulations made it more difficult for
planters to exploit the labor force through contract examination and labor dispute
arbitration, they were not comprehensive due to limited Bureau funding, manpower, and
the vast amount of complaints received.25
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By 1866, the Freedmen's Bureau required an extension to continue operations in
the South, as the original bill only stipulated for a year of existence. However, President
Johnson vetoed this bill on February 19, citing unconstitutionality and an increase in
federal power that was unnecessary during a time of peace. Johnson's decision to veto an
extended life for the Bureau was received with shock and represented continued
disaffection between Radical Republicans and the president. After the second
Freedmen's Bureau Bill successfully passed over Johnson's veto on July 3, the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 faced a similar struggle. The primary function of the Civil Rights Act
was to grant freedmen citizenship and equality before the law. However, the bill did not
include suffrage rights, a prospect that was not possible until early 1867. The Civil
Rights Act passed through the House and Senate in early April 1866, but was returned
after a presidential veto. Johnson and his conservative supporters' main argument behind
this veto was its alleged unconstitutionality, in that it "establish(es) for the security of the
colored race safeguards which go indefinitely beyond any...for the white race." Defying
Johnson's stance on the bill, Congress passed it a second time. With Southern
newspapers now decidedly pro-Johnson and many moderate Republicans siding with the
Radicals as a result of the two 1866 vetoes, the split between Congress and the President
would only widen by the official start of Radical Reconstruction with the Reconstruction
Acts of March, 1867.26
Illustrating Southern resistance against reconstruction measures, two large scale
instances of violence occurred in 1866, both involving local white police forces and black
Union army veterans. The first major act of collective violence in the Reconstruction Era
26
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occurred in Memphis, Tennessee. In April, 1866, tension rose in Memphis as discharged
black Union troops returned home, resulting in scattered cases of violence between these
troops and the local police force.27 By the end of the month, violence instigated by the
white, mostly Irish, police force escalated to the point where it was not safe for a black
person to leave the safety of their home. On May 1, a group of freedmen gathered and
exhibited "riotous and disorderly" behavior, but did not cause any harm to those around
them. But, the group erred in shooting their guns in the air after chasing a group of
Memphis policemen, resulting in a small skirmish. The House report on the Memphis
Riot found the threat of rioting by the local black population to be gone after May 1, but
on May 2 a white mob formed and "commenced an indiscriminate robbery, burning, and
slaughter" of freedmen and their property that lasted three days. The House report found
that forty-six freedmen and two whites had died, large property damage incurred, and
several rapes had been committed. Violence against freedmen in an effort to exert
control was more economically viable to planters after the Civil War, as emancipation
had eliminated their value as property.28
Shortly after the Memphis Riot, on July 30, 1866, New Orleans experienced a
similar outbreak of violence. This conflict was the result of a power struggle between
Governor James Madison Wells and the so-called "Rebel Legislature" of Louisiana.
Elected in 1865, this Louisiana legislative body contained large numbers of exConfederates, enough to make an impact on politics in the state. To emphasize the
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political inclination of this legislature, an excerpt from the Opelousas Courier (Dem.)
reads: "the (ex-Confederates) who had been ejected from their offices by the Governor
since the war, were and are the choice of the people." To regain control, Governor Wells
attempted to reconvene the convention of 1864 to disenfranchise the ex-Confederates and
to institute black suffrage. There was no quorum on the first attempt to reconvene, June
26, and the second attempt fell on July 30. On the morning of July 30, fearing white
resistance to the proposed tenants of the convention, around two hundred black Union
veterans marched to the Mechanics Institute, where the convention was to be held. By
this time a large crowd had gathered outside on the streets. Many of these black veterans
entered the building and barricaded the doors after the local police force shot at them.
Policemen then fired into the building, killing numerous freedmen. A House report
estimated for there to have been thirty-eight deaths. Investigative committees seem to
have been generally low in their estimates of casualties, as bodies were often disposed of
or buried by those close to the victim in secrecy. The same investigation found evidence
of premeditation, where the mayor of New Orleans was "determined...to break up this
convention by armed force."29
Both of these massacres were related to the return of black Union soldiers to
hostile environments, but the focus of violence shifted after the summer of 1866.
Republican discontent with Andrew Johnson had risen drastically after the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill and Civil Rights Act vetoes of early 1866. If black populations were able to
vote, to the dismay of most white Southerners, the South could conceivably be controlled
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by the will of its black citizens. After the New Orleans Riot of 1866, and especially after
the First Reconstruction Act, racial violence focused on controlling the political sphere.
Methods of controlling black labor had largely failed to this point and the chance of the
president restoring the "white man's government" was becoming less plausible with an
increasingly radical Congress. In late 1866, Johnson went on a campaigning tour of the
North, known as the "Swing Around the Circle," during which he fomented political
hostility. At one point during the tour he blamed Congress for the New Orleans Riot and
failed to mention the Fourteenth Amendment, proposed in July but facing difficulties in
ratification. These speeches only bred additional Republican discontent towards the
president. 1866 was the turning point in Johnson's presidency and his Swing Around the
Circle marked the unofficial end of Presidential Reconstruction.30
On March 3, 1867, the first of four Reconstruction Acts passed. With the First
Reconstruction Act, Radical, or Military, Reconstruction officially began. The bill
organized five military districts to keep order in the South, with Louisiana and Texas
forming the fifth under General Philip H. Sheridan's command. Current state
governments were deemed to be provisionary until new state constitutions were formed
that allowed universal male suffrage. Until the new state constitutions were accepted as
adequate, Southern states were not allowed to reenter the Union. Supplements to the
First Reconstruction Act stipulated registration and constitution convention election
deadlines and guidelines, clarified power held by district commanders, and closed off
loopholes present with the prior acts, such as registering but abstaining from voting in the
convention ratification elections. The Reconstruction Acts faced massive Southern
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opposition and the first act was vetoed by President Johnson, but Congress passed over
the veto without hesitation.31
In the Union League, an organization created during the Civil War, membership
exploded after the passage of the Reconstruction Acts in March, 1867. Leagues across
the South held public meetings for the political education of the freedmen, examined
labor contracts for fairness, and provided other essential services to the mass of
uneducated ex-slaves. The main purpose of Union Leagues was to serve as a "Radical
caucus," and focused much more extensively on political affairs than the Freedmen's
Bureau. Along with the Freedmen's Bureau, Union Leagues aided in the evolution of
free labor during the postwar years by attempting to secure fair contracts while providing
the stable labor force desired by planters. As freedmen became more politically
informed, their desire for political office also rose, creating conflict between planters and
Union Leagues across the South. The mere thought of an ex-slave in a position of power
evoked disgust in many paternalistically oriented Southern minds. Many Southerners
also blamed organizations such as the Union League and Freedmen's Bureau for instilling
illusions of upward social movement in the freedmen and inciting insurrection. Union
Leagues worked particularly well in sugar parishes, as the laborers were in much closer
proximity to one another in comparison to cotton parishes using sharecropping. The peak
of League influence lasted until the 1868 presidential election, where violence largely
destroyed its structure and greatly diminished its effectiveness for the remainder of
Reconstruction.32
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With the passage of the Reconstruction acts, freedmen became more aggressive in
asserting their rights and planters were forced into attempting different methods of
control as regional Republican power grew. Freedman participation in the political
sphere increased with the coming of universal suffrage and Democratic rhetoric changed
as a result. Freedmen occasionally missed work in order to attend political meetings and
rallies, angering planters greatly. Southerners were beginning to feel as if "the world
(was) all armed against" them. Southern conservatives targeted Radicals for giving
"incendiary speeches" to incite freedmen into an uprising.33 In late 1867, the Opelousas
Courier printed an article claiming that "leaders are familiarizing the minds of these
negroes with the idea of blood, firearms, confiscation, robbery, and plunder...Their
teachings are calculated to make the negroes dissatisfied with honest labor and the white
race." The fact that freedmen formed militias and performed armed drills, a practice
criticized by Union League officials in fear of a white response, only increased racial
tension. White fear of a black insurrection was a powerful driving force behind many
actions taken in the era and would occasionally end in what perpetrators believed was
preventative violence. Southern Democrats attempted several methods to control the
black population in politics and in labor, including through economic intimidation.34
To create uniformity in practice and solidarity amongst themselves, planters
regularly held meetings. In early November 1867, planters from Avoyelles and Rapides
parishes, both bordering St. Landry Parish to the north, adopted a resolution regarding
labor. These planters preferred flexible wages, where rates were set and labor was paid
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upon sale of the crop instead of on a monthly basis. They also refused to hire labor that
voted the Republican ticket or joined a Union League, arguing for such men to "exhibit a
hostile purpose to our interest." Republican labor in cotton regions usually experienced
lesser stability than in sugar regions, as cotton production was less intensive than sugar
year-round and a higher turnover rate was less damaging to overall yield. Southern white
Republicans were also targeted economically and boycotting was especially effective due
to the relatively low white Republican presence in the region. Michael W. Fitzgerald, the
prominent Union League scholar, found that freedmen still joined Union Leagues and
voted Republican, regardless of economic repercussions.35
Planters also attempted to control the labor force through conversion to the
Democratic Party. Rhetoric directed at freedmen often reflected paternalistic values
while directly attacking Republican organizations and Southern Radicals, who had
"poisoned" the minds of freedmen against planters and Southern Democrats. Judge
Cullon of Avoyelles Parish produced a series of letters during the summer of 1867 "To
Colored Voters" that were reproduced in regional Democratic papers. The function of
these letters were to "instruct you and protect you from designing men" who had
slandered Democrats and fabricated information about the Democratic desire to return to
slavery. Instead, Judge Cullon claimed, the Democratic Party fully supported the
"general welfare" of the freedmen. Democrats also held mass meetings and barbeques
"without distinction to race or color" preceding political events to garner votes.
However, these attempts at conversion often refrained from mentioning or lied about key
tenants of the Democratic Party, such as their stance on racial equality.36
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One Democratic solution to the question of labor was immigration. After the end
of the Civil War, planters proposed immigration to supplement the labor force, often
focusing on Asian immigrants, derogatorily referred to as "coolies." The Opelousas
Courier printed a sample contract for coolie labor in late 1865, requiring the laborer to
"bind" themselves for 5 years for whatever task their employer desired, abide by work
days and hours according to the "custom of the region," and face fines for work missed,
while planters provided food and shelter. Planters were generally discontented with the
status of freedmen labor and coolies were targeted next, most likely due to reports of
success from California. Although immigration as a solution had been present in
Louisiana during the early Reconstruction years, the movement took off after the
beginning of Radical Reconstruction. By early 1868, the Immigration Society of St.
Landry Parish formed for the purpose of attracting immigration broadly, without a
mention of racial guidelines. That same year the Opelousas Journal printed a series of
geographical descriptions of the parish, focusing on its "bountiful" wealth and availability
of resources, articles designed for those not living in the region. Unsurprisingly, Asiatic
labor immigration to Louisiana was not successful on a large scale, as harsh working
conditions generally served as a deterrent. Overall foreign immigration was unsuccessful
as well, as St. Landry Parish contained 305 people who were foreign born in 1860 (1.3%
of total population in the parish), 518 in 1870 (2.0%), and 529 in 1880 (1.3%).37
Under the guidelines of the Reconstruction acts, from September 27-28, 1867, a
vote was held to decide if Louisiana should have a convention and to elect delegates
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should the first vote prove successful. These elections took place in the midst of a
regional yellow fever outbreak, a distraction that may have limited total votes cast. Voter
turnout on the Democratic side was low, as regional blacks were expected to vote for the
constitution and for Republican candidates, resulting in low projections for a Democratic
victory. The vote for a convention was an overwhelming success for Republicans in
Louisiana, with St. Landry Parish realizing a 2,351-33 vote in favor. The election of
delegates was a Republican victory in terms of representation, with 86 of the total 98
delegates being Republican. Louisiana's black population was also represented, as a
convention in June 1867 stipulated that half of the delegates were to be black. Radical
James G. Taliaferro was elected president of the convention, the man who would oppose
Henry Clay Warmoth in the gubernatorial election of 1868. In St. Landry, the list of
delegates featured most of the influential Republicans in the parish, including George H.
Jackson (freedman), Auguste Donato, Jr. (homme de couleur) 38, Michael Vidal (white,
editor of the St. Landry Progress), and J.G. Drinkard (white, local druggist).39
By the end of 1867, blacks and Radicals both in the North and South were
optimistic about future prospects. Universal suffrage was imminent, conditions at work
had improved, and the men in charge of shaping Louisiana's new state constitution were
overwhelmingly supportive of their wants. As the education of freedmen increased with
the aid of federal agencies after Radical Reconstruction began in 1867, wages and
working conditions also improved. Strikes began to appear with more regularity and
planters were forced into necessary concessions in order to secure a reliable labor force,
38
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such as a broader acceptance of monthly pay schedules. After the Reconstruction acts,
progress in labor conditions for freedmen was consistently seen for the remainder of the
period.
However, Democrats and most white Southerners had not only encountered defeat
at the hands of those now reorganizing the South, but many had lost a large portion of the
wealth they had accumulated in antebellum years. After two devastating crop failures,
many planters who had relied on crop liens were deep in debt. As a result, black labor in
constant danger of not being paid by unwilling or unable planters during these hard
economic times. Political reverses had changed Democratic newspaper rhetoric to that of
a defeated nation and exhibited a fear of subjugation at Northern hands. 1868 would fare
no better for these Southerners, as a Republican governor was elected in Louisiana, their
presidential ally in Andrew Johnson was rendered mostly powerless and was nearly
impeached, the Fourteenth Amendment passed, and universal suffrage would be realized.
To this point, Democratic attempts at labor control, through legislation, contract fraud,
economic intimidation, and conversion had all largely failed. 1868 featured the first
national election of Reconstruction and a Southern hope that a Democratic victory would
return the region to the antebellum status quo. To secure these results, violence and
intimidation were used as means.

31
Chapter II
The Redemption of St. Landry Parish

The First Reconstruction Act of March, 1867 represented a considerable setback
in Southern aspirations to return to the antebellum racial hierarchy. As prior attempts by
Southerners had been largely unsuccessful in gaining this, new approaches were
attempted. Democratic secret societies began to form in mid-1867 with the purpose of
restoring the "white man's government" and preventing further reconstruction measures.
Setbacks to Southern ambitions occurred on the national level in 1868 with the nearimpeachment of President Andrew Johnson, the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the completion of many constitutional conventions that provided universal male
suffrage. With increasing frequency but escalating as the 1868 presidential election
neared, these secret societies utilized violence and intimidation to elect a Democratic
president who would support Southern desires.
Throughout the South, but primarily in Louisiana and Georgia, large scale
collective violence occurred in 1868 from late September through the November 3
presidential election that often crippled the regional Republican Party. As Republican
newspapers were often destroyed during the uprisings and Democratic newspapers
generally only explained one side of the story, an army report and testimonies represent
the majority of sources available on the pre-election violence and intimidation in
Louisiana. From mid-September through the election, Army Lieutenant Jesse M. Lee
was sent to Louisiana to investigate the violence, after which he produced a report that
detailed large acts of violence and estimated total casualties. In December, 1868 and
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May, 1869, a House committee took testimony regarding occurrences during the electoral
period. During the election, armed Democratic guards were frequently found at the polls
and anyone who voted the Republican ticket often found their life in danger. Violence
and intimidation were effective on the state level and provided Horatio Seymour (Dem.)
with victories in both Louisiana and Georgia, but Ulysses S. Grant (Rep.) was still able to
secure the national nomination. As the largest and arguably the most effective racial
massacre for long term Democratic prospects during Reconstruction, the St. Landry
Massacre is representative of the change in Democratic strategy experienced after the
1867 Reconstruction Acts.
On March 9, 1868, the Louisiana constitutional convention adjourned and
presented a new state constitution, labeled "The Negro Constitution" by the Opelousas
Courier (Dem.), that followed the regulations set forth by the 1867 Reconstruction Acts.
The votes both to accept the constitution and to elect civil officials for the state took place
simultaneously, from April 17-18, 1868. The new state constitution, Louisiana's first to
include a bill of rights, contained clauses providing for male enfranchisement for those
over 21 years old, equal access to state run schools, a requirement for every parish to
contain at least one school, and equality in public places and transportation, all "without
regard to race, color, or previous condition." However, requirements stipulated by the
new constitution were hardly followed. Instead, Southern Democrats attempted to
circumvent the requirements and gain control of the black vote through intimidation and
violence.40

40

Constitution Adopted by the State Constitutional Convention of the State of Louisiana, March 7, 1868
(New Orleans: Republican Office, 57 St. Charles Street, 1868); Taylor, 151-153; Ted Tunnell, Crucible of
Reconstruction: War, Radicalism, and Race in Louisiana, 1862-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1984), 117-119.

33
The vote for the new state constitution passed with ease in April, at 66,15248,739. During the Reconstruction era, voting practices usually went along color lines,
as white men generally voted Democrat while black men punched the Republican ticket.
Of the parishes that experienced large scale collective violence preceding the November
elections of 1868, Caddo, Orleans, and St. Landry parishes held majorities against the
constitution while Bossier and Jefferson parishes realized small victories for the
constitution. As the St. Landry Republican Party formed in April, 1867, most whites who
had been in the parish for any significant amount of time favored the Democratic Party
and opposed further reconstruction measures. The results of the vote for the new
constitution in April, 1868, illustrated this opposition, where only 32 whites voted in
favor compared to 358 black votes against. These votes were important, as turnout for
the vote consisted of 2,635 black men and 2,298 white men. The vote for the constitution
failed in St. Landry, 2,624-2,309. In Louisiana, Republicans emerged victorious in the
vote for the constitution and in the April elections for public officials, gaining a majority
in the state's legislature. But a Democratic victory on the local level in St. Landry Parish
foreshadowed the political turmoil that would envelop the parish later that year. This
local victory also stood as a clear indication that Democrats - former Confederate
political leaders, soldiers, and sympathizers - had not relinquished their cause.41
During the April elections, Democrats had little hope of a victory on the state
level, as newly enfranchised freedmen were expected to unanimously vote Republican
and Democrats could not expect the same political solidarity among the whites,
especially in New Orleans, where the federal presence was more stable. At the time,
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Louisiana contained nearly equal white and black populations, by the next census
counting 362,065 whites and 364,210 blacks. With suffrage, this large black population
represented a new and immediate threat to advocates of white political supremacy. Illprepared for universal male suffrage, the Democratic convention refrained from choosing
a ticket due to both what one Democratic newspaper called "a want of organization for
the Conservatives throughout the state" and a general feeling that the Republicans would
win easily.42
Even with no Democratic ticket, the Republican Party split into two factions, one
backing Henry Clay Warmoth and the other James Taliaferro. In St. Landry Parish, the
split occurred along two lines, within the Progress and the black population. Roudanez,
the homme de couleur editor of the Radical New Orleans Tribune, desired Taliaferro as a
candidate and drew the support of Casimier Edme Durand, the French editor of the St.
Landry Progress (Rep.). The Taliaferro faction won the support of the local hommes de
couleur and ran against Henry Clay Warmoth, who was supported by Emerson Bentley
and the local freedmen. Warmoth won convincingly, with 64,941 votes to Taliaferro's
38,046. In St. Landry Parish, Warmoth received 2,514 votes, Taliaferro 649, and Joshua
Baker (Dem.), the previous governor, received 1,187.43 As an example of the era’s
brilliant efforts at racial democracy, Oscar J. Dunn, a homme de couleur, secured the
position of Lieutenant Governor. Democrats mostly swept St. Landry Parish, in part due
to the Republican split, although most Republican votes seem to have gone to the homme
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de couleur candidate over freedmen or white Republicans in hopes of defeating the
Democratic nominees.44
St. Landry Parish was located in the Third Congressional district of Louisiana,
consisting of Lafayette, St. Landry, St. Martin, St. Mary, and Vermillion parishes, which
elected two Democratic state senators in 1868. St. Landry sent four Democrats to the
state House, leaving Republicans with no representatives from the parish in either the
Louisiana House or Senate. One of the men who won a state senatorial seat was Thomas
C. Anderson (Dem.), whose narrow victory over local Republican homme de couleur
leader Auguste Donate, Jr. was traced by one historian as the base on which Anderson
built his local power structure. The positions of district and parish judgeships, sheriff,
recorder, district court clerk, assessor, and coroner all went to Democratic candidates in
St. Landry, albeit by slim margins. While their power on the statewide level had
diminished, the April elections proved to be beneficial to the long-term success of the
Democratic party in the region. After the state elections, the Opelousas Courier (Dem.)
described the upcoming presidential election as crucial, calling all voters who opposed
Radical "Congressional usurpation and negro supremacy" to vote the Democratic ticket.45
After emancipation, freedmen lost their status as valued property that they
previously held as slaves. Consequently, violence was prone to occur at much higher
rates against freedmen, as evidenced by the Memphis and New Orleans riots of 1866.
While freedmen were murdered with regularity throughout the Reconstruction period,
incidence rates increased after the First Reconstruction Act passed in early 1867. After
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the Reconstruction Act, universal male suffrage was imminent and Southern Democrats
realized that in order to secure political victories, the black vote had to be influenced in
some way. As previous methods of enticement away from the Republican Party had
largely failed, Democrats increasingly turned to violence and intimidation to secure
Democratic political superiority. Democratic newspapers generally did not mention these
acts of violence and local law enforcement was apathetic for the most part, leaving the
relatively rare Republican newspapers to reveal these crimes.
On August 3, 1867, the St. Landry Progress (Rep.) posted a list of murders and
other violent acts against freedmen in the parish. A revised list complete with refutations
from the Opelousas Courier (Dem.) was published on August 24.46 32 incidents were
found in these issues, most involving the murder of freedmen, and according to the
Progress, "in no case, those crimes were avenged by Justice." The Courier cited an
absence of charges in multiple cases and claimed a lack of knowledge in others, in one
instance stating that "no clue has yet been arrived at." The Progress retorted with "nor no
clue could be obtained until diligence is used." An unwillingness to prosecute offenders
both in the local courts and with local law enforcement proved to be an effective weapon
in the Southern white arsenal during the Reconstruction Era, especially in country
parishes where military intervention was unlikely.47
Republican editors like Emerson Bentley were common targets for this violence
and intimidation, as these men often became local leaders for the Republican Party.
Bentley was born on July 15, 1850 in Columbiana County, Ohio. His father was a soldier
in the Fourth Wisconsin Regiment and became a dentist in New Orleans after the war. A
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precocious youth, Emerson exhibited an early interest in journalism and politics. From
1860-1863, Bentley procured an apprenticeship at the Jefferson County Republican, a
small Wisconsin newspaper. After the paper became defunct in late 1863, he returned to
Ohio as a compositor for the Salem Republican, remaining there until the end of the war.
After the Civil War, still in his mid-teens, Bentley made his first appearance in Louisiana.
While in Louisiana, Bentley was forced to relocate often, as his radical tendencies did not
mix well with the predominantly white Democratic communities.48
In 1866, Bentley was employed as a compositor for the New Orleans Tribune,
where he remained until he returned to Ohio for school later that year. In 1867, Bentley
returned to Louisiana permanently as a Freedmen's Bureau agent assigned to be a
schoolteacher in St. Mary Parish. Emerson's brother, Linden, was also a Freedmen's
Bureau agent, sent to Opelousas. However, Emerson's assignment in St. Mary Parish was
short-lived, as the cotton worm destroyed a large portion of the crop. Due to this crop
failure, planters were either unwilling or unable to pay labor. As wages for Bureau
agents were provided by a tax on wages received by labor, Bentley was not paid and
subsequently quit.49
While working for the Tribune, Bentley met Michel Vidal, a Frenchman. Vidal
was experienced as an editor, having worked in numerous French-Canadian newspapers,
the New York Messenger, and the New Orleans Tribune. In August, 1867, Vidal formed
the St. Landry Progress, a Republican paper owned by black stockholders. While at his
post as a teacher in St. Mary Parish, Bentley wrote several articles for the Progress. Due
to his acquaintance with Vidal and with Linden's insistence, Bentley became its editor
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after Vidal left for the state constitutional convention in November. The Progress was
published in English and French, with Casimier Edme Durand as the French editor.50
On March 2, 1867, the same day that the first of the Reconstruction Acts passed,
the Tenure of Office Act emerged, and this legislation also became the target of a failed
presidential veto. The Tenure of Office Act was designed to prevent the removal of any
presidentially appointed government official by the president without Senatorial consent.
However, President Andrew Johnson found a loophole in the act by early 1868, where the
president could suspend an official while Congress was not in session. In his capacity as
Secretary of War, Edward M. Stanton held control of the selection of military officials in
the military districting that came as a part of the Reconstruction Acts. In August, 1867,
Johnson suspended Stanton from his office while Congress was not in session. This act
roused Republican fears, which one historian described as a "fear of a coup, of a new
civil war, of rival armies, one serving the president and one serving Congress." On
February 21, 1868, Johnson removed Stanton, violating the Tenure of Office Act that he
himself had failed to prevent. This action was enough for Johnson's opposition to mount
an impeachment campaign, creating yet another source of sectional tension throughout
the nation.51
Johnson's impeachment trial began on March 30, 1868, containing eleven articles
of impeachment. Of these, nine were related to Stanton's removal and the other two dealt
with his intransigence towards Congress. The trial hung as a specter over the nation
during the spring of 1868 and as time progressed Johnson's position improved. As
Johnson had gained the presidency through the death of his predecessor, the president pro
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tem, Radical Benjamin Wade, was next in line. Wade was not a desirable option to many
moderate Republicans, which drew votes away from a successful impeachment. On May
16, 1868, the Senate voted on the eleventh article of impeachment, the closest to an allencompassing summary of charges. The result was thirty-five votes for impeachment
and sixteen against, just one vote short of the required thirty-six for a two-thirds majority.
On May 26, the session adjourned, giving Johnson a victory and the retention of his
presidency. However, by this point any support in Congress had been lost and any hope
of effective legislative action by Johnson for the remainder of his term was slim.52
In addition to the impeachment troubles for Johnson, the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified on July 9, 1868. Originally passed on June 13, 1866, around the time of the
second Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth
Amendment faced difficulties in the ratification process. In 1866, every Southern state
except for Tennessee strongly opposed the amendment and refused to ratify, leaving
many issues addressed in the amendment to appear in the 1867 Reconstruction Acts. By
1868, the Reconstruction Acts had largely sapped conservative strength in the South, and
on July 9, a three-fourths majority was gained with twenty-eight states ratifying the
amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment affirmed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 by
granting citizenship to everyone born or naturalized in the country regardless of race. If a
state denied a group of citizens suffrage based on race, its representation in Congress
would decrease proportionally with the number of those denied these rights. The law
also contained a clause excluding those who had "engaged in insurrection or rebellion"
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against the government from obtaining a position in the Senate, House, as the Vice
President, or as the President. Although the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment was
inevitable by 1868, Southern Democrats realized that universal male suffrage, especially
in states like Louisiana that contained large black populations, would lead to defeat at the
polls. The Opelousas Courier (Dem.) printed a response to the amendment, where "the
gravest apprehensions are felt and expressed here by leading men of both parties as to the
possible consequences of this usurpation on the part of Congress."53
By the summer of 1868, St. Landry Democrats were feeling a sense of
hopelessness, given the legislative occurrences since the end of the war. Economic
hardships were widespread after crop failures in 1866 and 1867, the Democratic Party
had experienced constant setbacks with federal legislation, attempts to control the labor
force and return to the antebellum social hierarchy had largely failed, and their
presidential ally was nearly impeached and had lost Congressional support. Although a
large amount of local positions had been won in St. Landry by Democrats in April, a
Republican governor and the signing of the state constitution, which included universal
male suffrage, were ominous. Without a successful presidential election, hopes for the
future were low. Seemingly without other options to secure their candidate's victory,
violence and intimidation became the means to a desirable end for regional Democrats.
During the summer of 1868, violence still appeared to be uncoordinated and
random, although frequent. In late June, night-riders shot at but missed a freedmen
outside of Opelousas, a "nightly occurrence" in the area. On July 7, masked men killed
two freedmen, one child, and wounded two other freedmen. In early July a freedman
prisoner was "rescued" from the parish jail but was never heard from again. Also in July,
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a freedmen reported the fear of even leaving his house, as he discovered multiple armed
men waiting concealed just feet from his door over the course of several nights.
"Outrages" on freedmen such as these were common during the summer of 1868, where
intimidation and violence was widespread throughout the South, but were particularly
frequent in Louisiana. Due to its relatively large size as a parish and its location outside
of federal military reach, St. Landry Parish was among the most afflicted in terms of
violence. Republicans felt that without a military presence, "free speech will be
dangerous (and) justice at law a mockery" in the parish. Warmoth confirmed this feeling
with an August letter to Washington asking for additional troops in order to prevent
violence and corruption within the state, a request that was denied.54
Newspapers in the South were often circulated to a far lesser extent than Northern
papers, as literacy rates and funding opportunities were much lower in the region. To
secure funding, patronage was often required, resulting in fierce competition between
local newspapers and often leaving some publications with short life spans. Most of
these papers were small and issued weekly. After the end of the Civil War, Democratic
papers in St. Landry Parish included the Southern Sentinel and the Opelousas Courier. In
April, 1866, the Republican Party formed in St. Landry Parish. By July, 1867, the first
Republican paper in the parish, the St. Landry Progress, came into existence, lasting until
its means of production were destroyed during the massacre preceding the 1868 national
election.55 The Progress was the official Republican paper of both St. Landry and
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Lafayette parishes for its lifetime. The formation of the St. Landry Progress led to
increased competition for scarce patronage, forcing the Southern Sentinel to reform by
late 1867 under new direction as the Opelousas Journal. Both the Opelousas Journal
and the Opelousas Courier would survive through the rest of Reconstruction, although
gaps in publication were occasionally necessary to remain afloat.56
At the St. Landry Progress, Bentley constantly found himself at odds with the
Democrats of the parish as an outspoken Radical Republican. He frequently argued
publicly with the editors at the Opelousas Courier, where the two papers were used as a
forum. Accounts given regarding occurrences at political meetings were common
grounds for argument, where one paper would print an article slandering local leaders of
the opposite faction and the ideals of their party, followed by the other paper's rebuttal.
Topics of articles printed in the Progress, whose slogan was "Truth, Justice, Equality,"
also drew Democratic ire, as universal suffrage and equal rights were regularly supported.
Tension grew throughout the summer for various reasons in St. Landry Parish, but all that
was needed to break the peace was an article written by Bentley describing Democratic
actions at a Republican meeting and procession.
In addition to being the Republican voice of St. Landry Parish, the Progress was
also unique in its relations with freedmen in the region. An attached clubhouse to the
Progress office also served as a meeting hall for the local Republican Party, where
weekly meetings were held on Sundays and usually contained 200-400 attendees. The
office also held Republican membership lists, which would be used by Democrats during
the massacre to identify and find local party leaders. Due to his interaction with the black
community both as a schoolteacher and as the editor of the parish Republican paper,
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Bentley quickly became a local Republican leader. In this position, both in St. Landry
and elsewhere during his lifetime, Bentley became the target of Democratic aggression
and consequently became ostracized from multiple white communities.57
The Knights of the White Camelia (KWC), a secret society similar to the Ku
Klux, first formed during the early summer of 1868 in St. Mary Parish under the auspices
of Alcibiades DeBlanc, an attorney, and Daniel Dennett, the influential editor of the
Franklin Planter's Banner. The primary goals of the KWC were to preserve the "white
man's government" and to protect the region "against the uprising of the blacks, if
necessary." From St. Mary, southeast of St. Landry on the Gulf of Mexico, the
organization spread quickly throughout Louisiana with "nearly universal" white male
membership in parishes won by Seymour in the November elections of 1868.58
St. Landry Parish was no different, as Joel Sandez, the Democratic editor of the
Opelousas Courier, estimated for KWC membership to be nearly 3,000 in a parish that
contained 13,776 total whites, including women and children. This seems to be a
conservative estimate, as multiple others claimed for membership to be general, or nearly
ubiquitous, among the whites. John C. Tucker, a Republican, testified that he was
"elected" into the club during the summer of 1868 by J. Saunders King, a prominent
parish Democrat, without his knowledge. Tucker felt the necessity to comply and join
both the KWC and the Hancock Guards "in order to preserve my life." Although the
organizations were present and there was some intimidation during the summer of 1868,
collective violence was not utilized until the fall. The KWC, led by James M. Thompson
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and R.A. Littell in St. Landry Parish, would be the central organizing force behind this
fall violence.59
A primary Democratic complaint during the summer of 1868 was that
Republicans were holding armed political meetings at night behind closed doors. They
feared that these white Radical "incendiaries," such as Emerson Bentley, would provoke
the freedmen into riotous behavior. One of the most common fears was that the freedmen
would burn the town and slaughter the white inhabitants within. However, Republican
political meetings were generally held during the daytime in public, contrary to some
Democratic rhetoric. Due to planter complaints of freedmen missing work to attend
meetings, Sundays were often chosen to prevent friction. Although local Republican
leaders mostly expressed a desire for attendees of these meetings to arrive unarmed, side
arms were generally carried at a minimum. But this was not uncommon, as the region
remained relatively unsettled in 1868 and guns were often carried for everyday affairs.
There were also incidents of harassment and violence towards freedmen on their way to
Republican meetings, so many felt not only the necessity of protection from nature, but
also from the local whites. These incidents increased during the summer, with tension
between the parties and the races rising as the presidential election neared. To exacerbate
Democratic irritation with regional Republicans, the St. Landry Progress was given the
coveted parish printing contract in early September, 1868.60
Also in early September, Bentley found a note posted on the schoolhouse door
that read "E.B. Beware! K.K.K." with a "dripping dagger, skull and bones, and coffin
painted on." By this time news of the Ku Klux had spread widely, and as there was no
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known presence of the organization in St. Landry in 1868, its signature probably used to
instill fear to a greater effect than any other organization's would. Another recipient of
this general threat was J.J. Beauchamp, the Republican chairman of the parish board of
supervisors, who found two threatening letters signed by the Ku Klux at his home during
the course of 1868. To a question asking of his knowledge of the Ku Klux in the region,
Beauchamp responded: "I do not know what the name of the organization is, but I am
satisfied that there is a secret organization of some kind there." Determined to stop the
"incendiary" speeches of the Republicans, Democrats targeted Republican leaders at an
increasing rate during the summer of 1868, and when September came the "war of the
races" seemed to be imminent.61
During the late summer, various reports circulated of two shipments of arms
arriving in St. Landry by boat from New Orleans for the purpose of arming the
Democratic population. Democrats denied knowledge of the shipments, but interrogators
seemed to have known of their occurrence. J.J. Beauchamp (Rep.) claimed to have seen
his neighbor preparing cartridge boxes for several weeks before the commencement of
the massacre on September 28. The first shipment was said to contain fifty police pistols,
or revolvers, and no knowledge was held on the contents of the second shipment. After
the massacre, area whites claimed for their actions to be in response to the impending
threat of a black insurrection, but the fact that Democratic rhetoric constantly referred to
the need for Republicans to gain protection by joining their ranks and due to the timely
arrival of arms to the parish, premeditation is not out of the question.62
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On September 13, 1868, a Republican meeting was held in Washington, the
secondary hub of St. Landry Parish, located about six miles north of Opelousas. After
this meeting, a procession organized and marched to Opelousas, where additional
speeches were given. The meeting featured two speakers, Sam Johnson, a black man,
and Armstead Lewis, a black preacher. As one of the handful of white Republicans in the
area, Bentley was scheduled to speak as well, but he was advised against it by those close
to him for his safety from the local Democrats. The week before this meeting, Democrats
claim to have heard "colored"63 speakers declare that they desired for black Democrats to
return to the Republican party, "at the point of the bayonet" if need be. Hearing of a large
Republican gathering, upwards of 1,000 people, occurring near Washington on the
morning of September 13, parish whites went to arms, believing that blacks intended to
burn Washington and kill its inhabitants. The resulting confrontation would begin the
chain of events that led to the St. Landry Massacre.64
In response to the large black gathering, parish whites gravitated towards the
towns of Opelousas and Washington in what they believed was a precautionary measure.
When the Republican procession arrived in Washington, its members found Seymour
Knights "drawn up in line" and in uniform on the street, later in front of the platform
where speeches were given. Parish Democrats were often members of multiple secret
societies, and the Seymour Knights were another one of these groups. The St. Landry
organization was led by Solomon Loeb, a local businessman, and Ferreol Perrodin, the
parish deputy sheriff who would become the mayor in early 1869, was second in
command. While the Democrats remained peaceful in action during this meeting, the
63

The source is unclear whether these speakers identified themselves with the hommes de couleur group or
with the freedmen.
64
House Misc., 406-416, 510; St. Landry Progress, 9/19/1868.

47
potential threat was high as individual speakers were threatened and reports of several
hundred armed whites, hiding in the nearby woods prepared to take action, were
circulated.65
Even though the meeting ended peacefully, the armed Democratic presence was
not welcome to the Republicans. During the meeting, Loeb and Bentley were seen
exchanging "harsh words" with one another. As the Republican procession returned to
Opelousas, L. Saunders King (Dem) and Edward T. Lewis (Dem.), a local lawyer who
would later lead the St. Landry White League, stopped the Republicans to explain
Democratic intentions for appearing at the meeting, which were preventative in nature.
During the discussion, a gun was fired from one of the two Republican wagons into the
air. King immediately pulled a gun and leveled it at Bentley's head, but as the origin of
the shot could not be discerned it was labeled as a misfire and the groups parted
peacefully.66
The events around Washington on September 13 resulted in two measures taken
by both parties in the parish prior to the massacre, a Democratic "interview" of Bentley
and a peace treaty signed between the leading Republicans and Democrats of St. Landry.
The interview occurred sometime during the next five days and consisted of local
Democratic leaders telling Bentley what their intentions were on September 13 and how
they should be represented in the Progress, or Bentley "would be held personally
responsible for it." The peace treaty, signed on September 19, focused on preventing the
conflict between Republican and Democrat, black and white, that seemed to be just
around the corner. Although Republican and Democratic meetings were reportedly open

65
66

Opelousas Courier, 12/14/1867; House Misc.,406-416; House Misc, Part II, 33-46.
Ibid.; House Misc., 406-416, 510-519; House Misc., Part II, 33-46.

48
to all by this point, the peace treaty contained a clause that allowed for the inclusion of all
parish citizens. The groups agreed upon provisions that disallowed any form of
"incendiary" comments, whether in newspapers or during speeches. Firearms of any sort
were not allowed from this point forward at any meeting or procession and alcohol was
not to be served at the meetings or nearby their location on the day of. The section about
firearms was important, as Democrats often complained about the amount of arms taken
by blacks to these meetings and this was a large point of dispute during the events at
Washington the week before. The results of the peace conference mostly reflected
Democratic fears, where a drunken black uprising would burn their homes and kill their
families. However, due to apathetic local law enforcement and greater white armament,
Republicans also benefited.67
The peace did not last long, as on the same day that the peace conference occurred
Bentley's article on the meeting and procession appeared in the Progress. Bentley later
claimed that he was only attempting to represent the truth behind the events at
Washington the week before, but Democrats felt that the article broke the terms of the
peace. In the article, Bentley wrote that "the assembly of armed men from all parts of the
parish did not indicate peaceful intentions, but a total blindness to the interests of the
people." Bentley also wrote of the intimidation present towards certain speakers, where
they were forced to refrain from speaking in fear of their lives. Furthermore, Bentley
directly attacked Democratic tactics, declaring that Republicans "do not plot in the dark;
we do not assassinate inoffensive citizens or threaten to do so; we do not seek the lives of
political opponents; we do not seek to array one class against another; but we intend to
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defend our just rights at all hazards." This article was the tinder that started the fire
within the parish, left to consume its inhabitants less than ten days later.68
At around 10 a.m. on Monday, September 28, 1868, Democrats Sebastian Mayo,
John Williams, and James R. Dickson called on Bentley at the schoolhouse when Bentley
was teaching. Mayo was a local constable, Williams was a stranger to the area, and
Dickson was a lawyer at the time, later to become a district judge. The three men, all
Seymour Knights, approached Bentley, declared that he had broken the peace treaty with
his article depicting the events at Washington on September 13, and demanded a
retraction of that article. Outgunned and outmanned, Bentley signed the retraction but
the three men, led by Dickson, gave him a “severe caning” of around thirty blows,
causing the children to flee the schoolhouse. During their flight, Mayo was reported to
have "pointed his pistol at them." This violent outburst was but a prelude to the chaos
that would encompass St. Landry Parish during the upcoming weeks.69
The children, upon escape of the schoolhouse, believed that Bentley was killed.
Word spread quickly through the parish about the murder of a prominent member of the
Radical Republican community. But, unbeknownst to the children, Bentley was still
alive. After the attack, Emerson's brother, Linden, found him with a large group of black
citizens heading to the office of the justice of the peace to file an affidavit. After filing
the affidavit, Bentley was told that there was fighting in Opelousas and if he returned his
life would most likely be lost. Injured and in danger, as the massacre commenced,
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Bentley hid in a barn behind the Progress office until the next morning. On the morning
of September 29, Bentley left the barn in fear of a Democratic search and hid in some
weeds until the next day. By this time, Bentley had not eaten or drank anything for a
period of thirty-three hours and decided to make his escape, where he was "chased by an
armed body of white men" across a field and escaped with the aid of friends. Bentley hid
in gullies and various safehouses, including John Amrein's (Rep.) barn on the eighth
night after the massacre, until he was able to board a skiff to Plaquemines, located east of
St. Landry and southwest of Baton Rouge on the Mississippi. These safehouses were
usually owned by freedmen, hommes de couleur, or white Republicans who personally
knew the traveler and were used for short-term protection. The people who aided the
fleeing Republicans were momentarily safe from the wrath of the locals, usually through
swearing allegiance to the Democratic Party. From Plaquemines, Bentley found a
steamer and traveled to New Orleans in an escape that lasted three weeks. While Bentley
was able to escape, many Republicans and blacks in the parish were not as fortunate.70
As word spread regarding the apparent murder of Bentley on the morning of
September 28, local Democratic leaders sprung into action to prevent Republican
organization from occurring. The primary men in charge were the head of the local
Seymour Knights chapter, Solomon Loeb, and the two leaders of the St. Landry KWC,
James M. Thompson and R.A. Littell. Acting immediately after Bentley's caning, L.
Saunders King received "an order from (mayor Felix King) to stop all armed bodies
coming into the town of Opelousas." Large groups of Democrats mounted their horses,
armed themselves, and searched the region for any signs of organization, as their
70

Supplemental Report of Joint Committee of the General Assembly of Louisiana on the Conduct of the
Late Elections and the Condition of Peace and Order in the State (New Orleans: A.L. Lee, State Printer,
1869), 38-40, hereafter known as Supplemental Report: House Misc., 406-421; House Documents, 184.

51
longtime fear of a black insurrection found itself manifested in reports that "a large body
of whites had been killed, and that nothing would stop it but extermination." Armed men
went from house to house, searching for black people and either arrested them or worse.71
Some black men attempted to prevent the impending violence in the first stages of
the massacre, such as John Simms, a homme de couleur, who collaborated with the
Democrats by sending a group of black men back home who were on their way to
Opelousas. The first report of black coordination came from "General" Thomas
Anderson's plantation, but Simms was able to send the estimated 30-40 men away by
convincing them that Bentley was alive and that there was no need to come to his aid.
However, in the only other instance of black organization during the massacre, the black
men did not turn back.72
At around 3 p.m., reports circulated that a group had organized at Halaire Paillet's
plantation, one mile south of Opelousas. L. Saunders King (Dem.) was once again a
member of the first group to arrive, which Democrats claim to have been no larger than
eight people, where he found a group of around two dozen armed black men. Upon
ordering the black men to lay down their arms and to come peacefully with him to
Opelousas, the black leader refused and gave the order to open fire. The short skirmish
resulted in one black death, a fatal gunshot wound to King's horse, and several injuries on
both sides, including Thomas Anderson's cousin, Baylis, and a Captain Mayo.73 The
white group captured eight black combatants and took them to the courthouse in
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Opelousas, later brought to the local jail, while the remainder of the survivors fled into
the surrounding woods and fields.74
After the skirmish at the Pailett plantation, "no armed negro organization was
found" in the parish for the remainder of the massacre. Yet the white population
continued to gather in Opelousas, increasing to between 2,000-2,500 by nightfall, a
number maintained the following morning. By September 29, a Washington citizen
found a scene of general black abandonment of their homes: the inhabitants either taken
away or had fled the area. Understandably, no blacks who had not already sworn
allegiance to the Democratic Party could be found in Opelousas, and while shots were
heard occasionally, no murders within the corporation were reported. Patrols roamed the
region for around two weeks with the purpose of "disarming" the blacks and Democratic
leaders posted sentinels around Opelousas and Washington in order to prevent black
citizens from entering or leaving. While it is entirely possible that the black organization
had been crippled beyond repair on the first day, the more plausible scenario was that
there was no plan in place to burn Opelousas and kill its white inhabitants. The largest
group of black men reported found was at the Pailett plantation, and they were no threat
to overtake the immense white presence in Opelousas. In fact, one Confederate veteran
agreed that the "negroes were entirely at their mercy" by the second day, victims of an
"uncontrollable excitement" that gripped the white population. But this white population
showed no mercy, as the scattered killings across the parish on the second day were
reported to represent the highest body count during the massacre.75
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Throughout September 28 and the early part of September 29, black citizens had
been rounded up and sent to the prison in Opelousas, estimated to be twenty-nine in total.
Two of these men were Joseph Gradney and his brother, who had heard about the
troubles on September 28 and proceeded unarmed to Opelousas from nearby Washington
to check on the status of their family. On their way, the brothers encountered a white
patrol, who brought them to Opelousas. The leader of the patrol was heard speaking to
"Colonel" Thompson, and was ordered to "kill anything that was captured" instead of
taking additional prisoners. The prisoners remained in the jail overnight, but they would
not stay there long. At around 4 p.m. on September 29, Loeb was overheard talking to
the jailer in order to acquire the jailhouse key at a certain time. That night, sometime
after 10 p.m., a crowd "broke into" the jail, removed the prisoners from their cells, and
took them to an undisclosed location outside of the prison that held over thirty armed
Democrats led by Loeb. Fortunately, the Gradney brothers were separated from the rest
of the prisoners by Ferreol Perrodin (Dem.), the deputy sheriff. Perrodin denied that he
helped the Gradney brothers, but they cited a personal acquaintance with the lawman as
the reason for his aid. The rest of the prisoners were taken a short distance into the
woods in small groups to be shot. The bodies were left where they fell for several days
until they were buried haphazardly, "with portions of the body out of ground...upon
which the buzzards were feeding."76
At around 10 p.m. on September 29, around the same time that the prisoners were
executed, materials used for and the press of the St. Landry Progress were taken into the
street and either destroyed or set ablaze. The benches for the schoolhouse where Bentley
taught were also "torn to pieces, and the school (was) broken up." The Progress was the
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voice of the St. Landry Republican party, and while its destruction crippled the party in
St. Landry, it was not the only paper to have been destroyed during this time period. By
May, 1869, those involved directly with newspapers in Louisiana believed there to be no
Republican paper within 100 miles of the parish, the nearest being in Nacogdoches,
located to the northwest of St. Landry in Natchitoches Parish. Unsurprisingly,
Natchitoches was one of the two parishes not located on the Mississippi River to vote for
the Republican candidate in November, suggesting a relative lack of violence and voter
intimidation. As violence dismantled the regional Republican party, its members
survived either by fleeing the area or by converting to the Democratic party.77
Presumably, before the Gradney brothers were released, they received some form
of protection from the Democratic wrath. After September 28, no black person could
travel into Opelousas without a red ribbon tied around their arm, a symbol of Democratic
conversion and safety from violence. Protection papers were also passed out in the
weeks after the massacre and blacks felt compelled to file these for their own safety.
Their signatures on these papers declared for them to be members of a Democratic club,
and were thusly "entitled to the friendship, confidence, and protection of all good
Democrats." There were no political meetings after September 28, Republican or
Democrat. There was no need, with the regional Republican presence eradicated and the
November vote secured for the Democrats. Beverly Wilson, a blacksmith in Opelousas
and an influential black Republican, believed that by the end of 1868, black citizens were
"in a worse condition now than in slavery." Republican inhabitants of the region felt a
sense of hopelessness, as even exhibiting Republican ideas was enough to endanger their
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lives, and those that did not flee or were killed found themselves with no option other
than to convert to the Democratic party.78
The St. Landry Massacre was a general uprising that lasted around two weeks,
and most able-bodied white Democrats were involved in one way or another. Actions
taken by white Democrats during this time were supported by local civil authorities, who
"refused to execute" any affidavits against those who had committed the atrocities. After
caning Bentley, Dickson was arrested for the attack but had escaped the same day, the
matter not to be revisited. During this time, especially during the first several days of the
massacre, Republican leaders were hunted. One such leader was C.E. Durand, the French
editor of the Progress. As a representative of the "incendiary" speakers that regional
Democrats grew to despise, Durand was to be made an example of. The editor was not
seen after the night of September 28, and although the exact date that he was murdered is
unclear, Durand was killed sometime within the first three days of the massacre. By the
third day, Durand's corpse was put on display outside of the Opelousas drug store as a
warning to other "incendiaries." The drug store was owned by Claudius Mayo, an
influential Democrat and Sebastian Mayo's brother, in a partnership with James
Thompson (Dem.). Durand's murder and the attempts on other white Republicans are
significant, as they help dispel Democratic claims as to the reasons behind the
massacre.79
Democratic testimony usually described the events as a personal conflict that
escalated into a race war, and their reaction of mass murder was one based out of fear of
a black uprising that would compromise the life of every white person in the area. One
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historian described the white response as conditioned, a result of constant warnings
against black insurrections by the Democratic community. The Democratic leaders were
able to use this conditioning, as newspaper articles and rhetoric were increasingly
targeted towards the possibility of a black insurrection since the passage of the
Reconstruction Acts, in order to eliminate the Republican presence in the parish and
establish Democratic control. At one point, Loeb was heard saying that the Democratic
plan was to "kill every man who has been engaged in deceiving the freedmen and trying
to create enmity between the races.” The idea of this being purely a race riot is false, as
white Republican leaders were also targeted and blamed for giving the black population
illusions of progress. During the massacre, Southern conservatives expressed fears that
blacks "were going to ride in Mrs. So-and-So's carriage, and to sit at Mrs. So-and-So's
table" in attempts to stir up the white masses. But these were just tools to incite the local
white population, as actions of local Democratic leaders during and after the massacre
suggest political ambitions, and not one of defense and protection from a black
insurrection. The elimination of these Republican leaders would allow for the Democrats
to control, through violence and intimidation, the black vote that would decide the
November election in St. Landry.80
Most Republican leaders in St. Landry were able to escape, but not without
difficulty. The Donato brothers, hommes de couleur, and Sam Johnson, a freedman, were
both able to leave the area, but no record survives of their escape. At around 8:30 p.m.
on the night of September 28, while hiding in the barn behind the Progress office,
Emerson Bentley overheard Solomon Loeb say "Come on boys; Let's go get Francois
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D'Avy." During the course of the day, D'Avy had conversed with multiple other
prominent Republicans to decide a course of action, including Linden Bentley and
Gustave Donato. These Republican leaders decided that D'Avy would write a telegram
to the governor describing the events while the others sent couriers to warn the black
inhabitants of the parish. By nightfall, D'Avy felt as if the excitement had died down and
that he was not in danger. But, sometime between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m., a group of men
came into his house and pulled him into the street. While on the street, the group taunted
D'Avy, struck him with the butt of a gun, dislocating his shoulder, and shot him, grazing
the side of his face. D'Avy escaped by feigning death, but a picket stopped him on his
way out of the area. He managed to escape, but not without a dislocated ankle. Moving
between safehouses and recovering from multiple injuries, it took D'Avy eighty days to
arrive in New Orleans.81
John Amrein, the Republican parish judge, was ill with yellow fever during the
second half of 1868. One of Amrein's sons died on September 28 of causes unrelated to
the massacre, but armed Democratic guards did not allow him entrance into town for
burial in order to limit Republican communication, so Amrein buried his child in the yard
at his plantation on the morning of September 30. During the weeks after the riot,
Amrein received multiple visits from regional Democrats, the first coming just hours
after he buried his child. Here, a group of over a dozen men approached Amrein,
claiming an intent to "disarm the radical party." But, the conversation quickly
degenerated into insults directed at Amrein, and at one point the Democrats blamed the
massacre directly on him and other Republican speakers, having "advised these colored
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men to make all this fuss and riot." At this, the party of armed men left Amrein and his
sick family safe for the moment.82
About three weeks after the riot began, Amrein began to receive additional
Democratic callers at night, led by J. Saunders King. King promised Amrein's safety
through the door, then proceeded to question the Republican at gunpoint about the
Knights of the Grand Republic, an organization designed to aid widows and orphans of
the Civil War and to support reconstruction measures. Amrein promised the men a copy
of the organization's constitution, which he provided for them the following day. Before
leaving, the men told Amrein that he should remain at home, as night patrols were a
danger to him. Two nights after Amrein provided the constitution, groups of men
appeared at his house and surrounded it, making their presence known but not taking
action. This continued for three nights. On the fourth day, Amrein traveled to Opelousas
but was too sick to continue at one point and was forced to stay in a safehouse for several
days. As the parish judge, Amrein felt relatively safe from violence, but upon hearing
warnings about his safety and of an order of banishment from the parish from friends in
Opelousas, he decided to contact James M. Thompson (Dem.), a local KWC head.
Thompson confirmed his banishment, explaining that Amrein's “politics do not suit the
people.” Amrein was forced to sell his plantation, but as he was still stricken with yellow
fever throughout this entire ordeal, he remained in the parish until he recovered in early
January, 1869, when he left for New Orleans.83
As the violence had largely subsided by the end of October, Swan Miller and J.
Baptiste Antoine falsely believed that they were safe to return to St. Landry and distribute
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Republican tickets. Miller was a Swedish immigrant that favored Republican politics and
Antoine was a local Republican. Miller was not present during the September and
October violence, having left St. Landry in July of that year due to "animosities exhibited
against (his) politics." Antoine had a close encounter during the massacre, where he was
taken into the woods with a freedman named Tony. Tony was shot, but Antoine was able
to escape by swearing Democratic allegiance. Upon arrival in the town, the men were
denied accommodation at a local hotel and were confronted by a group of Democrats.
The group questioned their political affiliation, but the Republicans were able to pass
without trouble as Antoine carried a Seymour and Blair badge for such an occasion.
Later that day, Antoine was taken to the prison, but not before discarding the Republican
tickets he carried. The white locals in charge appear to have not known Antoine's
political affiliation with certainty, as once again they let him go free with a mere promise
of giving a Democratic speech that night. Antoine was able to escape the parish under
the cover of darkness, but Miller, seen being taken away as Antoine was escorted to jail,
was not as fortunate.84
After being denied accommodation at the hotel, Miller went to the Freedmen's
Bureau office, where he encountered ex-agent Oscar Violet and conversed with him
outside of the office. Violet blamed Miller for his removal from the Bureau post, as
Miller reported Violet earlier that year for ordering a black man off a plantation, treating
him "roughly and unmannerly" in the process. Violet, known to be of Democratic
tendencies, often placed planter's ambitions over those of the black laborers. Upon their
return to the office, Miller found an estimated 30-50 armed men waiting for him, who
gave him ten minutes to leave Opelousas lest he wished a violent removal. The armed
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group relieved Miller of his Republican tickets then Ferreol Perrodin and a Bureau agent
escorted him out of town. Although Perrodin sided with the Democrats throughout the
canvass, this was the second noted occasion that he went out of his way to prevent
additional violence. These men left Miller after he had made it around two miles outside
of Opelousas, but "a good many" men were following the group, including individuals
who had threatened Miller previously. Perrodin and the Bureau Agent were relieved by
another deputy sheriff, C.C. Dasson, who unsuccessfully ordered the trailing men to
return to their homes. Miller and Dasson made it to the woods by dusk, where the deputy
sheriff left Miller to his own devices. Dasson made it no more than fifty yards away from
Miller when the attackers rode in at full gallop, pistols drawn. Dasson fired at one of the
men and missed, but this gave Miller enough time to escape into the woods, where he hid
that night. During the course of the night and the following day, the group continued to
search for Miller, who eventually escaped with the aid of a black man. More than a
month after Bentley's caning and mere days before the election of November 3,
"terrorism still exist(ed)" in St. Landry.85
Accurate death tolls are difficult to discern for most Reconstruction violence,
including the events in St. Landry. White evasiveness and solidarity in testimonies
usually only provided minor details or general information already known to
investigators. The black population was usually so scared of white retribution that they
remained silent if they wished to remain in the area. The St. Landry Massacre also
featured many different groups of whites riding around the parish committing "outrages"
against blacks and white Republicans, and if the state Democratic leaders knew of the
number killed in total, they did not let it be known. Jesse M. Lee, a lieutenant for the
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United States army, was sent to Louisiana on September 18, 1868 to investigate turmoil
in various regions in the state. When Lee arrived in St. Landry on October 3, he found an
intimidated black population alongside an uncooperative white population, and felt that
no information would be available unless there was a military presence. Lee found that
in "most parts of the State a systematic series of outrages, robberies, and murders were
committed on the loyal people with the avowed intention of intimidating, and thus
forcing, them to abstain from voting, and of driving" the Republican leaders out of the
area.86
Lee's report estimated that 223 total deaths occurred in St. Landry Parish during
the massacre, but white solidarity and black fear forced him to rely on the Democratic
press for some of these numbers, as with "the state of lawlessness and intimidation
existing it has been impossible to procure full evidence from this parish." General
Hatch's report for the Freedmen's Bureau encountered similar difficulties in obtaining
information and only reported 23 deaths, the number that most Democratic testimony
seemed to have agreed upon. The Board of Registrars for St. Landry Parish estimated for
over 200 total deaths. Democratic testimonies fell between 23-75 total deaths while
Republican estimates ranged between 200-500. However, the dates in which the
Republican estimates fell varied, as violence was common enough to begin including
deaths as early as March, 1868. As no Republican newspapers were in existence in the
area at this time, Democratic papers are the only sources available that provided numbers.
The far-right Franklin Planter's Banner, edited by the same Daniel Dennett who had
helped form the KWC in Louisiana, estimated that 100 black deaths had occurred, a
number that regional Democratic papers appear to have agreed upon. During this time
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period, Lee's report confirmed only two white deaths, one Republican and one Democrat,
and the highest estimate of white Democratic casualties was four. No estimates were
given as to white Republican deaths, but John Amrein (Rep.) testified to a House
committee that investigated occurrences during the 1868 presidential canvass that "every
leader of the republican party whom I knew of, who did not escape, has been killed."
Judging by the general state of lawlessness in the region and the vigor in which the
Democrats hunted Republicans, 250 black deaths is by no means an impossibility, and
the total number of deaths probably fell between 200-250 from September 28 until
November 3. Large numbers of Republicans also fled the region, and although actual
numbers are not known with certainty, Emerson Bentley estimated for the total to be near
200. The massacre was a Democratic success, and Dennett stated that the Democrats
were "well satisfied with the result."87
The presidential election on November 3, 1868, was by no means fair. The
Republican population of St. Landry parish and of Louisiana as a whole was intimidated
into submission. Republicans who had remained in the parish were compelled to join
Democratic clubs to ensure safety. When they arrived at the polls, armed guards
distributed Democratic tickets to the voters and made sure that the tickets were placed in
Seymour's box. The supervisors of registration for St. Landry were "fully convinced that
no man on that day could have voted any other than the democratic ticket and not been
killed inside of twenty-four hours thereafter." In an election where Seymour received
39,557 votes to Grant's 25,233 in Louisiana, St. Landry Parish was one of seven in the
state that did not record a single Republican vote. In fact, Grant majorities were all
found, with the exceptions of Rapides and Natchitoches parishes, in parishes on the
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Mississippi River, where federal control was more secure. While Grant won the
nomination, Seymour's victory in Louisiana was carried by violence.88
Fair voting practices in the presidential election were not the only casualties of the
fall violence. Congressional elections on November 3 were also fraudulent and often
very lopsided due to a nonexistent Republican voter turnout and corruption at the polls.
The election in the Third Congressional District of Louisiana between C.B. Darrall (Rep)
and Adolphe Bailey (Dem) is another example of violence impacting poll results. As in
the presidential elections, Darrall did not receive a single vote in any of the district
parishes other than St. Mary. Citing fraudulence and intimidation, Darrall contested
Bailey's seat by early December, 1868. By this point, returns from St. Martin Parish had
already been thrown out due to "a want of legal returns," or fraud. Republican testimony
unanimously stated a desire to vote for Darrall, but the overarching fear of white
retaliation towards Republican action prevented most from voting the Republican ticket
after the massacres of September and October. Fraud most likely reduced total
Republican votes to zero.89
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April Gubernatorial Returns
Parish
Candidates
Warmoth
Lafayette
743
St. Landry
2,514
St. Martin
1,057
St. Mary
2,019
Vermillion
133

Taliaferro
121
649
915
811
39

Baker
137
1,187
530
3
70

Voorhies
0
0
0
0
0

November Congressional Returns
Candidates
Darrall
Bailey
0
1,420
0
4,683
1,132
0

By February, 1869, Bentley left New Orleans for a position as assistant editor of
the St. Bernard Herald. But, shortly after Bentley began work, John Tucker (Rep.), the
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Assistant Assessor of Internal Revenue in Opelousas, proposed a partnership in starting a
new Republican paper in St. Landry Parish. Tucker felt that anti-Republicanism in the
parish had waned since the massacre, to the point where it was safe for their return.
However, Tucker was mistaken, as the parish remained hostile to Republicans of any race
throughout Reconstruction and eventually became the home to the first of Louisiana's
White League in 1874. Democrats had something to gain by preventing the
establishment of the paper, as Warmoth promised Bentley and Tucker the state printing
contract. If their paper was unsuccessful, Senator Thomas C. Anderson (Dem.) arranged
for the contract to go to the Opelousas Journal, a relatively moderate paper under the
influence of the Democratic parish leaders. By early May, the U.S. Army 25th Colored
Infantry Regiment arrived in Opelousas, sent to the area to ensure peace in the aftermath
of the deadliest uprising in the Reconstruction Era. As he was not fully convinced that
the white population would not harm him, Bentley stayed with the black soldiers in their
camp on the outskirts of Opelousas for protection.91
Similar to Lieutenant Jesse M. Lee's report on conditions immediately after the
massacre, upon its arrival the black regiment found a deceptive peace, where Captain
Frank M. Coxe reported that "although everything indicates quiet and order, it is not
difficult to discern a temper...which uncontrolled would jeopardize the life of any
Republican in his public expression of opinion." The Democratic white community was
virtually silent as to the events of the previous fall, but tension rose as the military
presence lingered. Threats were made on Bentley's life and eventually, some locals
threatened to attack the camp if Bentley was not released into their control. On May 11,

91

Emerson Bentley Journal; U.S. Army 25th Colored Infantry Regiment Letterbook, Hill Memorial
Library, Louisiana State University; House Misc., Part II, 44.

65
1869, Coxe reported that 50-100 "regulators" were in the wooded area nearby ready to
make such an attack, although action was never taken. Even with the military presence,
multiple incidents of violence with racial and political overtones occurred within the
Opelousas city limits.92
The first reported case of violence was against John Tucker (Rep.), Bentley's
partner, on May 23, 1869. Tucker left the confines of the army's camp at around 10 p.m.
and 4-5 men followed him into Opelousas. Here, these men attacked Tucker with the
"purpose of assassination," resulting in two gunshot wounds and a blow to the head. One
of the shots grazed his arm and the other went through the arm, fracturing a bone in the
process. Tucker survived this attack, and with the aid of Coxe, attempted to find the
offenders and turn them over to local authorities. Upon investigation, Coxe found an
uncooperative population who showed "no general desire that the perpetrators be found."
Parish officials, such as Judge Garrigues (Dem.), were sympathetic to Tucker's attackers
and were generally unwilling to aid Coxe in his investigation. The day after the
assassination attempt, a pamphlet circulated that declared for Tucker to have been drunk
upon leaving the army camp, accidentally shooting himself. Tucker testified that he was
sober at the time of departure and Coxe confirmed, writing that the pamphlet was most
likely "fabricated for the purpose of self-exoneration."93
Eventually, Tucker received a subpoena to testify before the Congressional
Committee on Elections, but he was told "that he should not live to testify against this
community." Tucker's case was similar to many others across the South during
Reconstruction, where civil authorities were unwilling or unable to prosecute criminals
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for crimes against blacks or white Republicans. Coxe's letters to his superior illustrate a
frustration with the local government, expressing that "this occurrence, previous ones of
like nature, (were) liable at any time to be repeated due to the utter inefficiency of the
civic government." He estimated that hundreds of "outrages" against white Republicans
and freedmen since the war's end had occurred, yet no investigations had taken place
even though the guilty parties were often known to local officials. In fact, Coxe believed
that securing an effective local government required a military presence, with a large
number of soldiers ready to be called into the area. These locals resented anything
Republican, and despised the military presence to the point where the black soldiers were
not safe from being targeted.94
Little more than a month later, in late June, another incident occurred in
Opelousas. An elderly owner of a saloon in town, John Cochran (Dem.), refused service
to one of the black soldiers who stopped in for a drink on his way to a dance at the local
dance hall. Upon leaving the saloon and rejoining several other soldiers, the black soldier
was followed and accosted by a half dozen men, one of whom was Captain May, a
participant in the massacre nine months prior. One black soldier was struck with a club
wielded by Cochran then Captain May drew a pistol and told the soldiers that "no
damned United States uniform can protect you here; we are going to clean you all out in a
few days." The soldiers were unarmed at the time, but were able to escape without
serious injury. Following the confrontation, with the local authorities not taking action,
Captain Coxe filed an affidavit. The case eventually wound up in the district court, but
justice was not found. During the trial process, Coxe showed continued exasperation
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with the regional legal system, describing the juries as those "pledged to save from
punishment their own Confederates."95
By May, 1869, although many local whites described the parish as being peaceful
and law-abiding, Coxe found that "a formidable reign of terror has subdued the spirit of
the people...I have never seen in my continuous experience in reconstruction duty, a class
of people...so completely crushed as among the loyalists here." In the 1870 census, St.
Landry Parish contained 13,776 whites and 11,694 free blacks. As a general rule, the
white population voted Democratic while the black population voted Republican during
Reconstruction, so the facts that Grant received no votes in November and that
Democrats held a stranglehold on parish politics speaks volumes of the local impact of
the St. Landry Massacre. 96
As the largest incident of violence during Reconstruction, the St. Landry
Massacre accomplished its purpose of electing a Democratic president on the local level.
Republicans in the parish were intimidated into submission, exiled, or killed. After the
massacre, Democrats secured control of St. Landry and the parish Republican Party was
unable to recover for the remainder of Reconstruction. As a response to the electoral
bulldozing by violence and fraud found in 1868, preventative state and national
legislation came into existence over the next several years. However, this legislation's
effectiveness was short-lived, as Southern conservatives began to gain influence while
Radicalism waned nationally. As Southern governments were beginning to be
"redeemed" back into Democratic hands, Southern conservatives were able to use their
successes in 1868 as blueprints for regional control. After 1868, violence as a means of
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control was utilized by Southern conservatives when other methods failed, plaguing the
South for decades.
.
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Chapter III
To Maintain the White Man's Government

While the St. Landry Massacre succeeded in its initial goal of electing a
Democratic president, at least on the local level, it impacted parish politics and power
structures in the long-run as well. Thomas C. Anderson, a Democratic state senator, was
able to secure a power base in the parish after the massacre and controlled parish politics
and patronage for the rest of Reconstruction. As violence by secret societies permeated
the South in late 1868, preventative measures were taken on state and national levels to
prevent similar occurrences. In Louisiana, one of these measures created the Returning
Board on Elections, a committee that could discard any votes it deemed to be fraudulent,
ultimately playing a role in deciding the outcome of elections in the state for the
remainder of Reconstruction. Nationally, the Fifteenth Amendment and the First
Enforcement Act passed as attempts to secure and federally enforce rights granted to the
freedmen in the Fourteenth Amendment and at the polls. As a result of this legislation
and further legislation that increased federal enforcement powers, violence and
intimidation as they occurred in 1868 were no longer possible. However, after the
massacre, no Republican organization was found in St. Landry until 1872 and no parish
Republican paper was produced until 1876. In 1874, St. Landry became the host of the
first Louisiana White League, a paramilitary organization that focused on the
"redemption" of political control from Republican to Democratic hands. But, its presence
was unnecessary in the parish, as St. Landry's redemption occurred in 1868.
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St. Landry Parish was not the only area to experience collective violence in the
South during the 1868 presidential campaign. Local leaders often sanctioned these acts,
as Lee, the federal investigator sent to the region after the massacres, found the violence
not to be "the work of rowdies and roughs; their influential movers and backers were men
called respectable and influential." Bossier, Caddo, Jefferson, Orleans, St. Bernard, and
St. Landry parishes all reported large scale collective violence, but increased violence
was a regional phenomenon across the South and was not isolated in Louisiana. Second
only to Louisiana, Georgia also experienced violence on a broad scale, the largest
outbreak being the Camilla Riot. Camilla, the county seat of Mitchell County, was
located in southwest Georgia. As local Republicans were gathering for a meeting in
Camilla on the morning of September 19, white locals fired on them and killed nearly a
dozen. Democrats in Camilla expressed the same fears present in St. Landry, where they
felt that if the black population assembled inside of the corporation, an uprising would
occur and white lives would be in danger. While the number of black deaths was much
lower than that experienced in Louisiana, its effect on the black population was similar.
In the November presidential election, only two Republican votes were tallied in Mitchell
County and Georgia became the only Southern state other than Louisiana and Tennessee
to realize a Seymour victory.97
Large scale violence and intimidation occurred throughout Louisiana during the
late summer months of 1868 and its effectiveness was far greater than previous
Democratic attempts to restore the antebellum racial hierarchy. Where labor fraud,
legislation, and economic intimidation had failed, large scale collective violence provided
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Horatio Seymour (Dem.) a victory in Louisiana in the November presidential election.
Only two country parishes away from the Mississippi River and federal military reach
voted for Ulysses S. Grant (Rep.) in November, both of which reported little to no voter
intimidation during the presidential canvass. Several parishes within federal military
reach, surrounding New Orleans and on the Mississippi, experienced collective violence
as well; even in areas where federal military control was found they could not adequately
suppress the general white uprisings that occurred in the region. This violence
established long term Democratic dominance in several Louisiana parishes and created a
blueprint for political control for the remainder of Reconstruction.
Most collective violence in Louisiana during the presidential canvas began in late
September and lasted through the early November election. Yet, the effects of these
massacres were long term and played a role in the Democratic dominance that would
envelop the state in 1874. Bossier and Caddo parishes, located in the northwest corner of
Louisiana bordering Texas, experienced consistent violence throughout the
Reconstruction Era. One historian even argued that Caddo Parish experienced the most
violence in Louisiana during the period, in terms of deaths. A U.S. Marshal in
Shreveport described the area as a "desperate part of the country" and a "great place for
drinking, gambling, and shooting." Heavily concentrating in cotton production using
sharecropping, Caddo Parish contained a black population of 15,799 and a white
population of 5,913 in 1870. However effective, in 1868, levels of violence in Caddo
Parish did not reach the levels of other areas of the state, including Bossier Parish. White
perpetrators were often found to have crossed parish lines during incidents of collective
violence and this was reported in both the Caddo and Bossier incidents. The fact that
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both parish seats, Shreveport in Caddo and Benton in Bossier, were within twenty miles
of each other allowed for these perpetrators to travel with ease between the two parishes.
The violence in Bossier Parish was even closer, occurring less than ten miles from
Shreveport. While the Ku Klux was not noted as far south as St. Landry Parish,
testimonies reveal its presence in these two parishes and not that of the KWC, but as their
methods and intents were similar, differences between the two are negligible.98
The primary incident in Caddo Parish occurred on October 12, 1868, when local
whites took five black men from the local brickyard to the river and shot them. This was
a regular occurrence in the parish, as one witness estimated for 25-30 bodies to have
floated down the river from the summer of 1868 until the November election. On
October 14, Robert Gray, a Republican Justice of the Peace elected in April but never
allowed to occupy that position by local Democratic leaders, was shot and killed. Just as
in St. Landry, local Democrats confiscated Republican tickets, prominent Republicans
found themselves in danger if they remained in the area, armed men surrounded the polls
on election day, and Republicans only tallied one vote in November. This Republican
vote was cast by James Watson, who was killed that night. Lee's report estimated for
forty-three black deaths in Caddo Parish during this time period. In December,
Democrats held such a stranglehold on the parish that two local whites sentenced for life
in prison were "rescued by an armed crowd," once again illustrating the inadequacies of
law enforcement in rural Louisiana parishes. While violence in Caddo Parish was
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effective, only the massacre in St. Landry eclipsed the death toll in Bossier Parish during
the 1868 presidential canvass.99
Just as in Caddo Parish, Bossier Parish relied heavily on cotton production and
held a population that contained 9,170 black people and 3,505 whites. Outrages in
Bossier began on September 27, 1868, when a stranger from Arkansas named Gibson
arrived at the Shady Grove Plantation and argued with freedmen there. This
confrontation resulted in the stranger firing a shot at an old black man, labeled as a
Radical, which missed him. The freedmen then restrained Gibson and chained him to a
tree, hoping to turn the prisoner over to local law enforcement. The next morning,
Gibson was retrieved by a group of white men who claimed a desire to take him to the
civil authorities in Bellevue, the closest town. The freedmen obliged, having little hope
of successful prosecution but glad to be rid of the man. After this incident, word spread
among the white population about a black uprising, whose members reportedly "yelled
and whooped like a set of infuriated demons as they gloated over the prospect of spilling
the white man's blood." Shortly after white lawmen retrieved Gibson from the freedmen,
a white mob of over forty men arrived at Shady Grove and began an "indiscriminate
slaughter of the colored people."100
Although most black citizens in Bossier Parish eventually fled to the surrounding
countryside, the parish was unique in terms of 1868 Louisiana violence where a black
group mounted an opposition after the initial hostilities. After the violence at Shady
Grove, a group of around twenty-five black men traveled to the nearby Baer Plantation,
where they arrested two of the men involved in the killings. Although their claimed
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intention was to bring the two men to Shreveport for trial, the whites were shot along the
way. The murders of the two white men sent the local population into a frenzy and bands
of Democrats proceeded to patrol the countryside, claiming disarmament as a goal but in
reality slaughtering large quantities of black citizens. The U.S. Marshal, sent from
nearby Shreveport on September 30, did not see any living freedmen aside from servants
during his journey to the area, only finding corpses on the side of the road. The violence
continued at this pace throughout the first week of October, but began to simmer after
that. However, those expressing Republican sentiments were not welcome in the parish
and were threatened with death should they stay as Republicans. Lee's report estimated
for 167 total deaths during this short but effective time period, where only one
Republican vote was cast in the presidential election.101
Although violence was comparatively less common in sugar parishes and along
the Mississippi River when compared to country parishes, these parishes were by no
means isolated from uprisings. As Warmoth's earlier request for federal military aid
yielded no results and at this time it was illegal to form a militia, the state of Louisiana
approved an act on September 13 that established a Metropolitan Police force which held
jurisdiction in New Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard parishes. This police force was
under the direction of a board of five supervisors appointed by the governor, removing
controlling power from civic authorities that proved unwilling or unable to prosecute
offenders in racial injustices. Intact until 1877 but significantly weakened after their
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1874 defeat in the Battle of Liberty Place, the Metropolitan Police became the primary
Republican response to violence in the New Orleans area during its lifetime.102
While some incidents were reported in the New Orleans region during late
September and early October, escalation mostly occurred during late October as the
election became imminent. Jefferson Parish was basically an extension of New Orleans
at this time, where the parish seat of Gretna was across the river from New Orleans, so
violence in the two parishes often contained the same offenders and occurred within the
same time frame. In 1870, Jefferson Parish contained 11,054 blacks and 6,709 whites.
On October 23, 1868, a group of white men organized claiming intent to disarm the black
population to prevent an uprising, but instead ransacked homes and stole anything of
value within, in the process threatening Republicans with death should they vote for
Grant in November. Finding these men to be a mockery of the code of chivalry preferred
in the South, Lee reported that "nothing seemed small enough to merit the disdain of
these chivalric gentlemen. To steal fifty cent pieces and old women's spectacles from
'niggers,' was not beneath the dignity of these champions of 'a white man's government.'"
Only nine deaths were reported, but the white mob succeeded in its goal of Democratic
domination in the parish. Out of 2,400 total registered black men, 1,742 did not vote in
November, giving the Democrats a victory in a parish with nearly a 2:1 ratio favoring
black voters over whites.103
On the night of September 22, a relatively minor outbreak of violence occurred in
predominately white New Orleans, which held a population of 140,923 whites and
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50,456 blacks. Here, a Republican procession was marching down Canal Street when
several Democrats taunted them from a store on the intersection of Canal and Bourbon
streets. Following the taunts, several whites began firing into the mostly unarmed
Republicans on the street, forcing them to scatter. Only one black man died while several
sustained wounds, but no other casualties occurred that day. Later that night, however,
Joseph Ellerson, a prominent Democrat, attempted to ring an alarm for a black riot, but
J.J. Williamson, the New Orleans chief of police, prevented him from doing so. Lee
determined for Ellerson's act to have been a signal to begin a massacre of local
Republicans. The next month in New Orleans was a time of "continuous and high
excitement," where a general state of lawlessness existed and attacks were "exclusively
by white Democrats upon Republicans."104
Little more than a month later, on October 24, New Orleans experienced a larger
outbreak of violence. Similar to the September 22 attack, on the night of October 24 a
Republican procession met a Democratic procession traveling in the opposite direction on
Canal Street. White Democrats, concealed in the center of the street on the divider,
began firing on the Republican procession. Immediately after the gunfire, those involved
in the Democratic procession broke rank and "stampeded" towards the Republicans,
firing at them. The uprising continued until the November 3 election date, as there was a
"hunt" for Republicans in the area. The white rioters ransacked Republican clubhouses
and besieged the office of the Superintendent of the Metropolitan Police. The Innocents,
a secret society based in New Orleans with red uniforms, were the main perpetrators here,
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but the Seymour Knights held a strong regional following and the KWC "drilled nightly"
in New Orleans.105
By October 26, after violence in surrounding parishes began, Warmoth found that
the "civil authorities in the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard are unable to
preserve order and protect the lives and property of the people," handing control of New
Orleans and the duty to preserve peace to General Rousseau. Two days later, on October
28, Rousseau issued an address to the citizens of New Orleans that prohibited gatherings
of "large bodies on the streets," reorganized the police force by removing "inefficient
members,"106 and warned those inclined towards violence that the military was now
supporting the local police force. However, violence against local Republicans
continued, prompting Rousseau to speak in front of an Innocents meeting on October 31
in a plea for peace. During the presidential canvass, Lee's report estimated for 65 total
deaths in Orleans Parish. Although the majority of the Orleans Parish returns were
invalidated because the board of supervisors that made the returns was not a legal one,
only 276 Republican votes were tallied despite the 36,000 registered Republican voters in
the parish. The October 24 violence in New Orleans sparked uprisings in surrounding
parishes, particularly in St. Bernard.107
St. Bernard Parish, bordering Orleans Parish to the southeast, contained a
relatively even black: white ratio, with 1,913 whites and 1,640 blacks. Around
September 20, racial tension in St. Bernard nearly escalated into violence when whites
coming from a Democratic meeting began to threaten both white and black Republicans.
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These Democrats, mostly armed, went into procession and "lost no opportunity of
insulting the black Republicans during the day, often brandishing knives and pistols in
their faces." Later that day, a large group of Innocents out of New Orleans searched for
the Republican Parish Judge, A.G. Thornton, claiming that he was at fault for the dearth
of black people at the meeting. The Innocents could not find Thornton, but local
Democrats announced their intent to dismantle the parish Republican Party here and one
week later at a Republican meeting, in which Warmoth was a speaker, where threats
against black men occurred and armed outposts organized with the intent of
intimidation.108
During the afternoon of October 25, the day after the violence in New Orleans, an
"unprovoked attack" occurred in St. Bernard when a Democratic procession found two
black men by the side of the road. These Democrats struck one of the black men and
pointed a gun at him, who then pulled his gun and shot his assailant in the shoulder. The
Democrats then killed the two black men, initiating a parish-wide massacre of black
people. Later that day, sugar planter Thomas Ong, the Republican chairman of the board
of registrars in St. Bernard, began to send for military aid. Local Democrats shot the first
courier sent, a policeman, before he could reach his destination. The second courier
arrived in New Orleans with a letter that described the parish as on the verge of a general
"slaughter of innocent people." With a nearly immediate response, a company of the 1st
Infantry, numbering 24 men, traveled from Jackson Barracks in New Orleans to St.
Bernard, leaving at around 3:00 a.m. on October 26 and arriving later that morning.109
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On the night of October 25, a confrontation occurred between freedmen and Pablo
Fillieu, at Fillieu's house. Who shot first is unclear, but Fillieu and at least one freedmen
died, with the house looted and burned. When the soldiers arrived in the area the
following morning, they received word that Ong was in danger and traveled to his
plantation. When they reached the plantation, the soldiers found a large group of over
sixty armed Democrats outside of Ong's gates. These Democrats blamed Ong, as a
Radical incendiary, for riling up the black population to the point of killing Fillieu. In
retribution, this "sheriff's posse" arrested several dozen men on Ong's plantation and
reportedly looted their homes. Due to their small numbers, the federal soldiers decided to
secure Ong's plantation and provide safety for Republicans in need, but those outside of
the plantation were still targeted by local whites. Lee's report estimated that 68 total
deaths occurred between October 25 and November 3, illustrating that while military aid
was available for parishes in the vicinity of New Orleans, its effectiveness was limited.
Many Republicans were arrested during this time period, one witness estimating 150 in
total, only to be released after the election had transpired. By the election, every
supervisor of registration in the parish was either in jail or had fled the region. As the
supervisors were the only people authorized to present electoral returns for the parish, the
sheriff had done so instead, resulting in the parish vote being thrown out due to illegal
returns.110
St. Mary Parish, located southeast of St. Landry on the Gulf of Mexico with the
parish seat of Franklin, contained one of the most conservative Democratic organs in the
area with the Franklin Planter's Banner. The Planter's Banner was edited by Daniel
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Dennett, who was also a founding member of the KWC in Louisiana. Although large
scale collective violence was not found here, intimidation and a general feeling of danger
amongst white and literate black Republicans was found. On September 8, Colonel
Henry Pope, the Republican sheriff based in Franklin, sent a response to a circular
regarding the state of affairs in the parish, where he mentioned low levels of violence but
found a "settled determination on the part of the leaders of the Democratic Party in the
parish to draw out by every means in their power all white" Republicans. By October 17,
this tension had escalated and two of the few local white Republicans, Pope and Judge
Valentine Chase, were "publicly assassinated" within Franklin's town limits. While the
white population vastly outnumbered the black population in St. Mary, 9,607-4,200, local
Democrats, both white and black in this case, were still able to hunt prominent
Republicans and either drive them out of the parish or kill them. On October 18,
materials used for the Republican paper in Franklin were destroyed and armed
Democratic patrols roamed the parish until the November election. This violence and
intimidation was effective, as the parish board of registrars found that the Democratic
majority "was not an expression of the will of the people."111
These parishes were by no means alone in experiencing violence during the 1868
presidential campaign, as nearly every Louisiana parish experienced some form of
violence or intimidation. Some parishes, such as Franklin in northeastern Louisiana,
experienced frequent violence but no information was found that suggests concentrated
collective killings. Here, Lee's report estimated fifty-seven deaths during the presidential
canvass and observed that Democrats ran the November election "with a ticket in one
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hand and a pistol in the other." Presidential electoral returns were invalidated in
Avoyelles, West Feliciana, Franklin, Jackson, Jefferson, Orleans, Sabine, St. Bernard, St.
John Baptist, Terrebonne, St. Martin, and Washington parishes, mostly due to illegal
voting procedures like the instances in Orleans and St. Bernard parishes. While
Republicans protested for additional invalidations due to intimidation or violence
impacting the returns, their cries were to no avail. Louisiana and Georgia were the only
two Southern states in which Seymour emerged victorious. With the invalidated returns
in Orleans Parish, parishes with large populations that contained an intimidated black
demographic, such as St. Landry, were able to carry the election for the Democrats,
leading to a lopsided 80,225-33,263 victory for Seymour in Louisiana. On the national
scale, however, Grant easily won the electoral vote 214-80 while narrowly winning the
popular vote 3,012,833-2,703,249. Although Democrats had lost the election that they
had deemed to be essential in the spring of 1868, the violence achieved long-term
regional Democratic dominance in many parts of the state, and ultimately across the
entire region.112
To dissolve the Democratic stranglehold on the country parishes gained as a result
of the 1868 violence, Republican officials on the state level took several steps. Signed
into law on April 5, 1870 and organized by 1871, a volunteer state militia was created
that helped offset the removal of a significant portion of federal troops in the South that
had taken place since 1868. This organization also provided a defense for state officials
to supplement the Metropolitan Police. Additionally, eight new parishes were created
between 1868 and 1871, including Grant Parish, which would gain notoriety with the
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Colfax Massacre of 1873. Warmoth appointed officials himself in these new parishes,
mostly located in rural northern Louisiana, providing Republicans temporary relief from
Democratic control, as the new officeholders were secure in their positions until the next
general election. However, the fact that St. Landry Parish was not among those
reorganized played a role in the Democratic domination in the parish for the remainder of
Reconstruction. After the St. Landry Massacre, Thomas C. Anderson was able to
consolidate power both in St. Landry Parish and on the state level, where he secured
multiple influential appointments over the course of his political career.113
On March 16, 1870, Louisiana passed a series of election laws. These laws were
designed to prevent the intimidation, violence, and fraud that permeated the 1868
elections. The most effective deterrent installed was the Louisiana Returning Board on
Elections, which could invalidate returns found to be obtained by fraud or other illicit
means. This Returning Board, described by one historian as the "most feared weapon in
the Radical arsenal," was able to control the outcome of elections for the party that was in
power and played a large role in Louisiana politics for the remainder of Reconstruction.
Initially, the board replaced its own vacancies, but the state senate gained the power to do
so in an 1872 Louisiana election law. In the 1872 and 1876 presidential elections,
Louisiana was one of the states to have its Returning Board invalidate its votes due to
violence and fraud.114
In 1870, the Louisiana Returning Board contained a four-man committee:
Governor Henry Clay Warmoth, Lieutenant Governor Oscar J. Dunn, Senator John
Lynch (Rep.), and Senator Thomas C. Anderson. Lynch would prove to be influential in
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the heavily disputed 1872 state elections, favoring Republican William Pitt Kellogg, but
Anderson's political affiliation is more unclear. Historian Joe Gray Taylor labeled
Anderson as a Radical Republican, but several other historians and sources from the time
period found him to lean more towards the Democratic Party. Historian Geraldine Mary
McTigue's dissertation provides what is probably the most accurate description of
Anderson, as an opportunist who was more interested in acquiring power while
remaining conservative in ideology, rather than setting his political affiliation in stone.115
By 1870, Republicans in St. Landry were still pacified to the point of inactivity.
On September 3, the Opelousas Journal printed an article titled "No Need of a
Convention," where the editors found no trace of Republican organization or Republican
candidates for the upcoming state elections. By this time, "General" Thomas C.
Anderson had solidified his power base within the parish. Anderson, born in Virginia in
1821, held terms as a state senator from 1864-1865 and 1868-1877. He also held one of
the coveted seats on the Louisiana Returning Board for its duration during
Reconstruction, from 1870-1877. In 1870, Anderson owned 1,800 acres of land and held
property valued at $30,000, making him one of the wealthiest men in St. Landry. But, a
large amount of his power came from patronage and corruption. Anderson owned part of
a navigation company and used his influence to allocate parish funds to the company,
which were mostly stolen. Anderson was also the school treasurer in the parish, accused
at one point of embezzling $85,000 from state funds. Anderson's control was so
complete that one historian concluded that all parish appointments went through him by
the early 1870's. As there was no Republican organization in the parish until 1872 and no
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Republican newspaper until 1876, Anderson was able to control the parish virtually
unchecked for the remainder of Reconstruction.116
On the national level, the Fifteenth Amendment passed as a direct result of the
violence that encompassed the 1868 presidential election. First proposed on February 27,
1869, ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment occurred on March 30, 1870. A short
document, containing only two clauses, this legislation provided that voting rights can not
be "denied or abridged...on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude"
while placing enforcement powers with Congress. However, as is later demonstrated by
multiple bills designed to increase federal effectiveness in the enforcement of
reconstruction measures, the intended effect of the Fifteenth Amendment was not
realized. Less than two months after its passage, additional legislation was in the works
that aimed to increase federal power and control Southern violence.117
Between 1870 and 1871, three Enforcement acts passed in order to protect rights
granted by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. Ratified just weeks before the
Fifteenth Amendment on February 21, 1870, the First Enforcement Act's purpose was to
prevent violence and intimidation towards voters. The most important section of the First
Enforcement Act was Section 6, which stated that "if two or more persons band or
conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of
another" with the purpose of preventing the "enjoyment of any right of privilege granted
or secured to him by the Constitution," a felony charge would be levied. However, these
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actions were still not a federal offense, hindering federal enforcement attempts. By early
1871, the First Enforcement Act had proven to be inadequate in enforcement powers, and
new legislation was necessary to prevent racial violence in the South.118
The First Enforcement Act targeted the rural South, but Northern cities also
experienced electoral fraud during the 1868 elections. To combat urban fraud, the
Second Enforcement Act passed on February 28, 1871, but held little impact in the South.
On April 20, 1871, the Third Enforcement Act passed, also known as the Ku Klux Klan
Act. This act followed a pattern of legislation during Reconstruction, where the federal
government received greatly increased power and size. Violators of Section 6 of the First
Enforcement Act now faced a federal court. As state and local governments had largely
been unwilling to secure these rights for the black population and were often found aiding
their violators, the President was now empowered to use military force and suspend the
writ of habeas corpus to secure adherence. The Ku Klux Klan Act also provided the
federal government with the ability to prosecute individuals. Until this point, federal
legislation had focused on states abrogating freedmen's rights while allowing these states
to hold most of the power to punish individuals. Federal legislation had mostly ended in
failure due both to the secretive nature of societies such as the Ku Klux Klan and a
general white solidarity on the state and local levels. With these new powers, federal
agencies were able to successfully destroy structures of Democratic secret societies as
they had existed and forced Southerners to resort to other strategies of regional control,
primarily fraud.119
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In the 1872 presidential election, Ulysses S. Grant (Rep.) ran for a second term
against Horace Greeley (Dem.). Violence surrounding the 1872 presidential election was
comparatively lower than the 1868 presidential election in Louisiana, as the 1868
massacres still influenced the actions of many Republicans and by 1872 fear of the
Enforcement Acts left Democrats resorting mostly to fraud instead of violence. But,
Democratic domination in St. Landry Parish continued despite being "free of
disturbance," where Greeley defeated Grant 2,817-1,584 votes. Grant still carried
Louisiana 71,663-57,029, but both Louisiana's and Arkansas's votes were thrown out due
to fraud. On the national level, Grant easily won the electoral vote 286-66, but Greeley
died shortly after returns were tabulated, causing a split in distribution among four
additional candidates. In Louisiana, the 1872 state elections would prove to be divisive
and hotly contested, the results of which would instigate additional large scale collective
violence within the state.120
By 1872, Radicalism had lost support nationally and Louisiana was no exception.
In Louisiana, the Republican Party split prior to the gubernatorial election, where
Warmoth disassociated himself with the general Republican ticket and ran with the
Liberal Republican faction, which opposed further Reconstruction measures. The Liberal
Republican faction and the Democratic faction, with candidate John McEnery, merged,
and if victorious Warmoth would gain a senatorial seat in Washington while McEnery
would obtain the governorship of Louisiana. This "Fusionist"121 faction was opposed by
the Custom House Republicans, with William Pitt Kellogg as the candidate. Stephen B.
Packard, the chairman of the Republican State Committee, and P.B.S. Pinchback, of gens
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de coleour ancestry, who held influence among black voters, supported the Kellogg
ticket. The Enforcement Acts had created the necessity for fraud instead of violence to
control elections, which crippled McEnery's chances as a Democratic candidate against a
Republican Returning Board. One historian found that, with Warmoth's support,
McEnery had most likely won the popular vote in the state, and the returns of St. Landry
tell both of this and the fact that Democrats still dominated the parish, where McEnery
received 2,948 votes to Kellogg's 1,346. So much fraud was noted that the Returning
Board split and each declared their own victor in the election, one led by Lynch
supporting Kellogg and the other by Warmoth in support of McEnery. This resulted in
two sets of state officials and in many parishes two sets of local officials, both vying for
one position.122
Since his inauguration in 1868, Warmoth had steadily lost support within
Louisiana. Warmoth inherited a large state debt, mostly from the Civil War when no
state taxes were paid, which he struggled with during his governorship. He also lost
support from "pure" Radicals through some of his political appointments, one example
being former Confederate General James Longstreet's appointment to Adjutant General.
Corruption within the Warmoth government, his veto of a 1868 civil rights bill, and the
compromise made in the 1872 state gubernatorial election were enough for his opponents
to push for impeachment. On December 5, 1872, Circuit Court Judge Edward Henry
Durrell declared for the Warmoth Returning Board to be illegal and ordered Packard to
prevent any "illegal assemblage" in the State House. Acting immediately and without
prepared articles of impeachment, Kellogg sympathizers voted 58-6 to impeach
122
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Warmoth. Under Louisiana law, Warmoth was suspended for the remainder of his term,
little over a month, and P.B.S. Pinchback, the Kellogg Senate President, was installed as
an interim governor. The matter was sealed when Grant recognized Pinchback as the
legal governor less than a week later. The 1872 Louisiana elections brought schisms in
an already weak Republican Party to the forefront and set the stage for additional
violence, albeit less ubiquitous in the state when compared to events in 1868.123
In some country parishes, the rival factions created by the split Returning Board
either refused to mutually accept Grant's verdict or news had not reached the area by that
time, one of which being Grant Parish. Grant Parish was created in 1869 with Colfax as
its parish seat, located on the Red River in northern Louisiana. Here, conflict between
the two tickets escalated by the spring of 1873. On the night of March 25, freedmen
seized control of the Colfax courthouse in order to secure the validity of the Kellogg
electees, swearing in their appointees the next day. By early April, black and white
numbers in the region swelled, both groups hoping to control the area. On April 2, shots
were exchanged between the two groups, but no one was hurt. On April 5, freedman
Jesse McKinney was shot and killed. These two events in early April "alarmed" and
instilled fear into the black population, causing them to gather in the Colfax courthouse
for protection. Over the next eight days, black forces attempted to fortify the courthouse
while white forces gathered in the surrounding area. Tension between the groups had
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grown to the extent that one witness declared that Colfax was "in a state of siege" until
April 13, Easter Sunday.124
On April 13, 1873, a white group of at least 150 members, led by ex-Confederate
lieutenant Christopher Columbus Nash, mounted an attack. The freedmen were severely
outgunned during this confrontation, leading to a massacre the scale of which had not
been seen since St. Landry in 1868. As the courthouse became overran, local whites set
it ablaze and shot any black citizens that exited in surrender. As in St. Landry, local
whites took black prisoners outside of the corporation and killed them after the
excitement died down. Because Colfax was in the Louisiana countryside, military
intervention was more difficult than it would have been near the federal garrisons in New
Orleans. Due to inaction and transportation difficulties, troops did not arrive in Colfax
until after the massacre. As in many of these racial massacres, actual numbers dead are
uncertain, with the preliminary Congressional report detailing 59 bodies found, only two
of which were white. Historians since have differed, with one more conservative
estimate ranging between 62 and 81 total deaths and another estimating between 70 and
165.125
To exacerbate racial tension and no doubt playing a role in the creation of White
Leagues in 1874, Louisiana passed civil rights legislation on April 18, 1873. This bill, a
forerunner to the federal Civil Rights Act of 1875, provided universally equal
accommodations "from all common carriers on land or water, from inn keepers and from
all public places of resort licensed by the State or by any municipal corporation." This
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act was ignored in the country parishes, where the Republican state government had little
control, and was rarely enforced in New Orleans. In 1902, the 1873 Louisiana Civil
Rights Act was repealed, having been of little significance during its lifetime.126
The first important interpretative ruling of the Fourteenth Amendment occurred in
the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), where a Louisiana chartered corporation had
monopolized butchering in New Orleans, forcing many butchers out of work. These
butchers claimed that the state had deprived them of the opportunity to pursue their trade,
violating their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The result was a ruling in favor of the
Louisiana corporation that redefined state and federal rights. Federal rights were
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, among them the right to run for a federal
office and access to ports and waterways. However, most individual rights were still
under state control. This was an important decision, as many of the struggles during
Reconstruction rested upon whether the federal government or the state held control over
individual rights. If the state held control, especially going further into the 1870's,
freedmen's rights granted by federal legislation were not necessarily guaranteed or
protected. The Slaughterhouse Cases set a precedent that would later be relied upon in
cases more directly involving freedmen's rights, such as U.S. v. Cruikshank (1876).127
After mostly resorting to fraud to control elections after the Enforcement acts
passed, Southern whites regained some confidence in violence and intimidation as
effective methods to do so by 1874, especially as Southern governments began to revert
to Democratic control. By 1874 in Louisiana White Leagues began to appear, the first of
which formed in St. Landry Parish. On April 17, propaganda for the St. Landry White
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League first appeared in the Opelousas Journal, one article containing a communication
from leading man Edward T. Lewis, a local lawyer, titled "White vs. Black – The
Coming Issue." Here, Lewis wrote that whites had a "manifest duty" to prevent black
men from holding office, but in order to do so the whites needed solidarity and
organization. Lewis also continued Democratic rhetoric claiming that white Republicans
were self serving and taught black populations a "fear of the whites" only to further their
own ambitions. If this fear was absent, Lewis foresaw that "the next election would
eventuate in a negro Governor and an exodus of carpet-baggers." Although instilling fear
in the black denizens of Louisiana was necessary for Democratic dominance in other
parishes, even the Anderson influenced Journal saw these measures as unnecessary in St.
Landry. The Journal believed that securing a good crop outweighed the necessity of
"political hostility to the blacks" in the parish. According to the Journal, there was less
organization among the black ranks in 1874 when compared to 1868, as there were no
black officeholders in the parish, and although there were black men on the school board
"there are plenty of white men who would make worse school directors." But, behind
these reservations were some of the same fears and ideals held by Lewis, where the
Journal wrote that it would be "foolish" for a black man to run for office and the feeling
that "whites were drifting...into the Republican organization."128
The St. Landry White League also impacted the state elections in late 1874. To
fill a vacancy in the Louisiana House, a special election occurred on December 29, 1873.
Here, John Simms, the Republican homme de couleur who attempted to prevent violence
in St. Landry during the 1868 massacre, easily beat three candidates who ran under an
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Independent ticket. However, only 733 votes were cast in St. Landry and one historian
found traces of a deal struck between Simms and Anderson for the position. Simms
would only hold his seat until the 1874 state elections, where he lost his bid for
reelection. This election was mostly swept by the Democrats, who ran against a
compound Radical ticket that was a compromise between parish Republicans and
Democrats, containing members from both parties. Democrats from both tickets won all
four positions in the state House and both seats in the state Senate. Representing the sole
substantial Republican victory in the 1874 Louisiana elections, Charles E. Nash (Rep.)
lost the vote in St. Landry for a Congressional seat but won the overall vote, the only
black man to do so during Reconstruction.129
During the summer of 1874, White Leagues appeared across the state attempting
to emulate the St. Landry organization, including St. Martin Parish. A leader of the St.
Martin Parish White League and a sugar planter, Alexandre DeClouet stated their
purpose as "consolidating the white race in another effort to restore our state to its
rightful rulers" and away from the "unscrupulous adventurers, knaves, and office seekers"
that influenced the "blind and ignorant negro voters." This rhetoric illustrated a White
League goal of removing Republican Governor William Pitt Kellogg, one such attempt
happening in New Orleans during September of that year. While white supremacy
remained the primary goal of the White Leagues, these organizations were different from
the secret societies that ran rampant throughout the state during the 1868 elections, as
meetings were generally in public view with no hidden intentions. Although the White
Leagues never had a strong central organization, local leaders were able to control its
129
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members much more effectively and focus violence to a much larger extent than the
earlier secret societies. These Leagues were usually able to secure localities through the
removal of Republican officials and intimidation of the black voters, leading to two cases
of large scale collective violence in Coushatta and New Orleans.130
Similar to Grant Parish, Red River Parish was formed in 1871 in northwestern
Louisiana, with the parish seat of Coushatta. By 1874, Republican carpetbagger Marshall
Twitchell created a power base in the parish much like Anderson's in St. Landry, holding
a seat in the state Senate since 1870, the presidency of the parish police jury and school
board, and a position as a United States Commissioner. Members of his family also held
influential positions within Red River Parish. To compound matters for planters during
the global depression that began in late 1873, the 1873 cotton crop had been ravaged by
the cotton worm in the parish, leaving many planters in a desperate economic condition.
As White Leagues focused on removing Republican power structures within Louisiana,
Twitchell and his fellow parish officeholders became targets. During the late summer
months and into August, rates of violence and intimidation increased, including the
murder of the deputy postmaster and banishment of the postmaster, culminating at the
end of August.131
On August 25, 1874, an argument between two white locals and several black
men occurred in Brownsville, eight miles south of Coushatta, where the black men
threatened the whites. That night, a white posse approached two of the black men, one of
whom fired on the whites, instigating a skirmish where the two black men and one white
man died. News of an imminent black insurrection spread throughout the parish and a
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large white crowd gathered in Coushatta by August 28, estimated to range between 700
and 1,000 people. Due to threats on the lives of Republican officeholders, white citizens
offered to take these Republicans into custody for protection. When the mob grew
increasingly volatile over the next day, six of the Republicans signed resignation papers
and were escorted out of the area on August 30. But, in the process of leaving, local
whites overtook the Republican escort and slaughtered all six, adding to the minimum of
a dozen black deaths from August 25 to August 30. Twitchell was safe in New Orleans
during the massacre, but during his return the following May an unsuccessful attempt was
made on his life.132
In early September, shortly after the Coushatta Massacre, rumors about shipments
of arms for the New Orleans White League began to spread. The Metropolitan Police
confiscated several crates full with arms on two separate occasions, then on September 13
sealed off access to the Mississippi, a ship that contained additional weaponry. The
seizure of the Mississippi infuriated the local White League, who called for all of its
supporters to assemble the following day in order to overthrow Kellogg. At around 2
p.m. on September 14, White League and Metropolitan Police forces met on Canal Street
and fought for nearly an hour. Here, after clearing part of Canal Street and fearing that
the White League forces would flank them, the Metropolitans fortified their position
facing south towards the docks and the Mississippi. However, the Metropolitans held
their ground in a "very exposed" place while the White Leaguers were able to use cotton
bales for cover, ultimately resulting in a near-complete White League victory.133
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This victory gained the arms aboard the Mississippi for the White League, but
they still strove to remove Kellogg from office, who had fortified his position in the
Custom House. White Leaguers were unable to breach the Custom House walls, but
most of Kellogg's forces within were unwilling to die for the cause and deserted,
dismantling the Louisiana State Militia established under Warmoth for all intents and
purposes and severely crippling the Metropolitan Police force. Within the next week,
federal forces were able to retake New Orleans from the insurgent White Leaguers and
restore Kellogg to his office, but roughly one hundred casualties had occurred by this
point. The Louisiana White Leagues represented a shift in the focus of violence, from the
massacre of freedmen and expulsion of "incendiary" Republican influences to secure
election results to the outright removal of Republicans from office.134
A new Civil Rights Act, largely created by Senator Charles Sumner (Rep.) in
1870, had failed to pass on multiple occasions in the following years and was the topic of
constant debate throughout the first half of the decade. The bill finally passed nearly one
year after Sumner's death, on March 1, 1875. The primary purpose of the act was the
requirement for equality in public accommodations and specifically mentioned "inns,
public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement."
Jurisdiction over violators of the act was given to federal courts rather than the state
courts, which had proven to be inadequate in prosecuting civil rights violators. However,
court cases increasingly ruled in favor of states when interpreting prior legislation during
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the 1870's and these decisions marginalized the Civil Rights Act of 1875. By 1883, in
the Civil Rights Cases, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was declared unconstitutional.135
The Enforcement acts received their first major test in U.S. v. Cruikshank (1876),
the case that resulted from the Colfax Massacre. The charge against the accused was a
conspiracy to deprive citizens of their rights, violating Section 6 of the First Enforcement
Act. But, only three convictions were obtained, and the Court overturned a conviction by
accepting callously that the prosecutors failed to mention race as the motivating factor
behind the incident. In another blow to freedmen's rights, Cruikshank ruled that the
Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen
against another.” This removed federal power to intervene in an area devastated by
violence, leaving that power to state and local authorities.136
The presidential election of 1876 was one of the most contested in American
history and the last of Reconstruction, pitting Rutherford B. Hayes (Rep.) against Samuel
J. Tilden (Dem.). In Louisiana, the gubernatorial election was held on the same day as
the presidential election, where Francis T. Nicholls (Dem.) beat Stephen Packard (Rep.)
by a slim margin. In St. Landry Parish, Tilden outpolled Hayes 3,745-2,432 and Nicholls
beat Packard, 3,750-2,445. Votes reported from Louisiana in the presidential race
favored Hayes, 75,315-70,508. Fraud was present on both sides and some intimidation
was found in several parishes that did not record a single Republican vote, but no
incidents of large scale collective violence were noted. As a result of the fraud in
Louisiana, all four members of the Louisiana Returning Board were arrested, their trials
135
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to be suspended until February, 1878. Thomas C. Anderson was the last remaining
member on the Louisiana Returning Board from its initial 1870 committee, and he was
the only one who would see the courtroom. Anderson was convicted and sentenced to
two years in prison on February 25. However, before the next member could be tried, the
Louisiana Supreme Court nullified the charges against all four and forced the release of
Anderson on March 18.137
In addition to Louisiana, returning boards in Florida and South Carolina declared
for the results in their state to be invalid, with Louisiana and South Carolina both forming
rival state governments, one Democratic and one Republican. All three states showed a
majority for Hayes, totaling 20 electoral votes, and with their removal Hayes lost the
election 184 votes to 165. Southerners had long realized that in order to secure fully
redeemed governments, the federal military presence could not remain in the region. To
obtain this, the two parties agreed upon the infamous Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877,
where the removal of the federal army from the South would occur in exchange for the
validation of the lost electoral votes from Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina. Not
only did this remove the federal military from the region, but the rival Republican
governments in Louisiana, led by Packard, and South Carolina were doomed to fail.
With no federal presence in the South, blacks and white Republicans were at the mercy of
the redeemed governments, officially ending the Reconstruction Era.138
The St. Landry Massacre and other similar events during the 1868 presidential
canvas in Louisiana had accomplished their initial purpose: to secure the electoral victory
for Horatio Seymour in Louisiana. But, the consequences of these massacres reached
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much further than the 1868 presidential election on the local, state, and national levels.
While the 1868 massacres were not able to spawn influential court decisions as Colfax
had, federal measures were taken and preventative mechanisms such as the Returning
Board on Elections were placed in Louisiana that would play a significant role in state
and national politics for the remainder of Reconstruction. Nationally, 1868 represented
the peak of collective violence during Reconstruction and illustrated that rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and other prior legislation needed additional
protection. This realization led to the Fifteenth Amendment and Enforcement Acts,
where the secret societies responsible crumbled only when the Third Enforcement Act
drastically increased federal power over the individual. As Radical tendencies decreased
by the early 1870's and Southern governments began the redemption process, a series of
court decisions allowed for states to retain control of most individual rights. As states
controlled by the Democratic Party were unwilling or unable to intervene when
freedmen's rights were violated, groups such as the Louisiana White Leagues were able
to usurp positions of influence from incumbent Republicans. In some areas, such as St.
Landry Parish, these organizations were unnecessary, as prior violence still controlled the
actions of the Republican populations. But in others, like Coushatta, the Democratic elite
was able to remove Republicans with established bases of power.
The 1868 St. Landry Massacre, the deadliest in Reconstruction, eliminated the
Republican element of the parish for all intents and purposes for the remainder of the
period. Democrats directly involved in the violence secured local offices as a result, one
example being Ferreol Perrodin and his ascension from deputy sheriff to mayor in early
1869. Those in charge were able to exponentially increase their power locally and
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occasionally on a state and national level, such as Thomas C. Anderson. Just months
after the 1868 massacre, the black "living witnesses of their horrors, fathers, brothers, and
sons, who meet us every day, dare not whisper a word in conviction of their crime" in
fear of Democratic retribution. The fear instilled in the local black population was so
effective and resulted in a Democratic dominance so complete that violence as a means to
secure electoral results was not necessary again until the 1890's, when outrages were
again reported in St. Landry on the eves of the 1894 state elections and the 1896
presidential election.139
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